<p style="text-align:center">Outline of a
RESOURCE STRUCTURALISM THEORY OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND PROCESS</p>

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2017 NOTE: This working paper—or perhaps more accurately set of notes—was begun in the early 1980s, but put aside because I thought it more important to develop in detail some of the implications of this theoretical structure for a specific substantive area. Hence, I undertook to develop a better understanding of the most neglected form of power, that is, status. (There are entire separate disciplines—political science and economics—that study political and economic power, not to speak of important subfields within sociology, but nothing equivalent for the study of status.) Moreover, such formal (and perhaps pretentious) theorizing fell out of fashion as the discipline shifted its focus to metatheory and quantitative empirical work. Nonetheless, the many of the ideas outlined here have been the background to much of my subsequent work and more specifically three books: *Status and Sacredness*, *Freaks, Geeks and Cool Kids*, and *Elites: A General Model,* as well as various articles. I have called a key portion of this framework "resource structuralism," though this is not a completely satisfactory label.   Following Marx, it proposes that changes or variations in key resources significantly shape the social structure and social processes. It strongly rejects the Marxian notion that material resources are nearly always the primary determinant of the nature of the social structure and culture—though this certainly can be the case.

This material is not developed enough to be published as book or article. As I approach the end of my career (and my life) I realized that I would never finish this project, so I have decided to make it available in this very imperfect form.

What follows is an outline of a theory of social process and social structure. Most of it is presented as a formally derived deductive theory in order to give a condensed overview—but the theory could also be presented in a less formal, more discursive (and lengthy) form. The utility of the theory is illustrated by deriving propositions relevant to a considerable variety of substantive areas in the social sciences, but this means that no single area is fully developed. At times concerns that are traditionally seen as quite disparate—e.g., organizational compliance

1

theory, capital theory, the efficacy of violence and types of suicide—are grouped together to illustrate how the theory shows new relationships and connections. Some of the roots of the theory are discussed in Appendix C. Appendices A and B elaborate points treated more cryptically in the body of the paper.

Rudimentary Concepts

The theoretical framework is derived from a Levi-Strauss type binary opposition: ***separation*** and ***combination***. Social differentiation is one example of the process of separation; in contrast the merging of social units or strengthening the solidarity within a given unit would be examples of combination. But separation and combination are also relevant on the symbolic level. *Typification* is the process of identifying the typical commonalities among the elements that make up the field of perception. *Abstraction* is the process of selecting and separating out certain elements of what is perceived. *Categorization* on the other hand is the process of combining together similar elements that have been abstracted. But typically what goes on both on the level of actions and symbols is not complete separation or complete combination, but rather both the separation-combination process *and* the process of ***linking***. Subgroups do form through separating dissimilar people and combining similar people, but typically, such subgroups remained linked to each other through various kinds of social mobility and exchange of goods, services and information. This is the central theme in Blau's (1977) work: the crucial social processes are differentiation of subgroups and the linking of such differentiated groups by means of cross-group associations. Freud's theory of instincts also gives a central place to the perpetual tension between process of Eros and Thanatos. "The aim of the first of these instincts is to establish ever greater unities and to preserve them there—in short to bind together; the aim of the second, on the contrary, is to undo connections and so destroy things" (1949:20). The mature person is able to balance, i.e., to link, these two instincts.

These three concepts—combination, separation, and linking – are often related dialectically. For example, differentiation, i.e., separation, begins within a social group (thesis). As this continues, however, there is a tendency for solidarity, i.e., combination, to develop for those who are similarly located along the axis of differentiation (antithesis). Finally these new subgroups typically become interrelated through the formation of various kinds of links, e.g., exchanges, authority structures, contracts between them, and a new type of social unit is created (synthesis). These processes are not, however, necessarily related in this way. For example, the differentiation that leaves some in dire straits can result in a situation of chaos and dog-eat-dog competition rather than solidarity.

Finally, I want to suggest that in all likelihood all of these sets of concepts are largely unconsciously derived from the processes of identity formation through interpersonal interaction. The creation of a human involves the establishment and maintenance of separate, but linked personal identities. Such identities are both constantly reproduced and modified through ongoing interpersonal interaction and other experiences with the external environment. It would

2

not be surprising to find that some of our most abstract and basic analytical concepts, e.g., the notion of the dialectic, are metaphors derived from this experience.

But the significance of these primary concepts—combination, separation, and the intermediary notion of linking—is not in finding parallels in previous theorizing, but rather their usefulness in deriving other fundamental analytical concepts. It is to that task that we now turn.

[Note: There are, of course, many philosophical discussions on these problems from Nagarjuna's critique, which is the philosophical basis of Mahayana Buddhism (see, e.g., *Encyclopedia Britannica*, "Indian Philosophy", p. 191), to Heidegger's *Identity and Difference* to Nozick's *Philosophical Explanations* . . . But I want to make this primarily a sociological argument, not a philosophical one.]

The Nature of Structure, Processes and Systems

The set of concepts which follows are for the most part cumulative. That is each subsequent concept includes the attributes of the previous concept plus the additional attributes specified. Moreover, the additional attributes generally emerge from the continuation of the fundamental processes of separation, combination, and linking. More specifically, they emerge from additional structural differentiation and linking of substructures into more complex systems.

Unit:
> an entity; an aspect of experience which is separated from the environment/field/background in which it is located and is in some respect given an identity.

Boundary:
> the "line" which separates a unit from its environment. Boundaries vary significantly in their degree of completeness (i.e., degree of separation), precision, and visibility.
>
> Social boundaries refer to social locations where interaction, associations, and physical movement between units is limited and usually restricted.

Identity: a "unit" that to some degree has boundaries and is given an identifying label. For example, the unit may be given an identity either by members of the unit, e.g., a family or a club, or by an observer, e.g., income strata or a species. Human subjects are a special case of units with identities; they have a self-conscious identity. Like all units the clarity and rigidity of the boundary and the integration and stability of the self are to some degree variable. A breakdown in such integration and stability is usually define as insanity; schizophrenia probably the classic case of such a breakdown.

3

Note: This definition of identity plays down the mathematical notion of absolute sameness and emphasizes the process of an observer recognizing a unit's sameness and giving it a name.

Relationship:

the linking of two or more units.

Structure:

a set of units that are linked together by a set of relationships in which the units are treated as relatively stable and constant for a given analysis.

System:

a structure with boundaries, i.e., to a significant degree differentiated (separated) from its environment. That is, the separated micro units are not only linked but they are combined into a macro unit that is, to some degree, separate from its environment. (This separation is can be physical (e.g. a human body), or it can be analytical (e.g. the auto immune system.) The implication is that (for some usually unspecified period of time) what goes on within the boundaries of the macro unit is determined more by the composition and structure of the micro units within the macro boundary than by factors outside the boundaries of the macro unit.

Examples: a bridge, a human body, an internal combustion engine or an ecological niche.

Process:

the transfer (separation and combination) of resources from one structural location to another, e.g. digestion: food from the mouth to the stomach to the blood stream. Typically processes are means of linking different units of a structure, i.e., "recombination" to form a dynamic system. The units and links which are treated as dynamic (i.e., take on variable values) for a given analysis.

Contradiction:

a unit or a link that involves tendencies toward both combination and separation.

Input:

the movement of resources into a system (combination).

Output:

the movement of resources out of a system (separation).

Dynamic System:

    a system which more or less regularly receives inputs of resources (combination) from the environment has internal processes and gives off output into the environment (separation). Example: wood stove.

Cybernetic System:

    a system in which some portion of the structure is differentiated (separated) to create a low energy subsystem (a feedback loop) to regulate a higher energy subsystem. Example: furnace and thermostat.

Activity:

    the conversion of internal processes in a system into outputs of kinetic energy which can be used to influence the environment of a system or the relation of the system to the environment.

Active System:

    a dynamic system in which a portion of the inputs are channeled into internal processes that produce activity, e.g., behavior, labor. Typically the remaining portions of the outputs are defined as waste.

        Example: internal combustion engine
        inputs: fuel, air, etc.
        outputs: activity: revolving crankshaft
            waste: exhaust and heat

Cybernetic Active System:

    a system with both cybernetic and active properties.
    Example: internal combustion engine with a governor.

Self-maintaining System:

    an active system with one or more cybernetic sub-systems that cause it to use a portion of its activity to (l) seek out inputs necessary to maintain its activity (2) avoid inputs that would hamper its activity. Such self-maintaining activity results in the system maintaining its structure and processes longer than would otherwise be the case.
    Example: a satellite which turns its solar panels toward the
        sun when more energy is needed and retracts them when too much sunlight threatens overheating; a self-defrosting refrigerator compared to a refrigerator without this feature.

Organism:

a self-maintaining system capable of reproducing a new system that is in most respects
identical to the parent system.
Example: a bacterium.

Sentient Organism:
an organism whose cybernetic systems are developed to the point where the organism is
sentient and experiences gratification and deprivation because of the absence of desired
inputs or the inability to avoid unwanted inputs.

Example: a worm

Unconscious predisposition: The ability of an organism to anticipate deprivation and
gratification and to take action to reduce the chances of the first and increase chances of
the second.

Instinct: a biologically based unconscious predisposition; "a natural or inherent aptitude,
impulse, or capacity; a largely inheritable and unalterable tendency of an organism to make
a complex and specific response to environmental stimuli without involving reason;
behavior that is mediated by reactions below the conscious level" (M-W Dictionary);
largely unlearned behavior. (Example: a bug that seeks a warmer location as mean
temperatures decline).

Unconscious behavior: behavior that is not primarily due to conscious rational decision making.
It can be either due to instinct or experiences and learning that has been repressed (in the
Freudian sense), or some combination of these. Examples probably include Jung's notion
of the unconscious, Levi Strauss's notion of structure and Chomsky's notion of deep
structures. With Jung's universal archetypes approximating instincts and the particular
cultural symbols used to express these being largely learned and cultural. Levi-Strauss's
"binary oppositions" are supposedly characteristic of all myths, however much the more
detailed content of these myths might vary. Chomsky's "deep structures," "generative
grammar," and "universal grammar" are "filled in" by the cultural creations, which are the
focus of Hymes's sociolinguistics.

Human Nature
The next step is to draw upon the concept of a "higher" organism and add additional
characteristics until we have arrived at a model of a human being. This derives, a set of ideas
that roughly parallel Freud's three notions of id, ego, and super ego. (Of course, the distinctions
also parallel the Parsonian transformation of the Freudian categories into the concepts of the

6

"action frame of references": cachectic, cognitive and evaluative.) There is also some congruence with Giddens' (1976:104) more recent distinction between power, meaning, and morals, but there are several significant ways in which his conceptualization differs from the one presented here.

[2017 Note: Need to include both an evolutionary biology argument, but even more important a strong argument that as evolution continued, increasingly human behavior and activity was shaped by symbolic abilities and the symbolic context rather than by the material context—though of course the material context continues to be significant. You don't get human beings until these symbolic capacities result in significant levels of inter-subjectivity.]

Interest (Ends):
> an input from the environment or an output into the environment that produces gratification or reduces deprivation. Some interests are rooted in biological needs, but many are largely shaped by past experience.

Resource (Means):
> a means of securing or protecting interests.

Scarcity:
> a level of resources that an actor defines as less than optimal.

Insecurity:
> the anticipation of deprivation—most typically due to uncertainty about levels of scarcity in the future.

(Human) Activity:
> a human attempt, i.e., an intentional effort, to comprehend or transform some aspect of the environment; the primal source of human power.

Three Axioms about "Abstract" Human Nature:

A1.0 Gratification, Scarcity, and Insecurity: People like all higher organisms seek to maintain or increase their level of gratification by pursuing multiple interests through activity, but they find this problematical because of scarcity and insecurity.

A2.0 Human Capacities: People have

(l) only moderate physical prowess and a limited range within which these capacities can be expanded

(2) very great capacity to abstract (separation), categorize (combination), symbolize (establishing links between sign and category) and construct meanings (linking of categories)

(3) a large capacity to store (i.e., remember) and recall these abstractions, and a large but finite range within which these capacities can be expanded by education.

A3.0   Propensity to evaluation: Because of their propensity to gratification and the ongoing process of coping with scarcity and insecurity (Al.0), and because of their ability to abstract, typify and categorize, people have a strong propensity to typify and categorize perceived differences in terms of their potential for gratification and deprivation, i.e., they have a strong propensity for evaluation.

Note: Strictly speaking, this is a derivation and not an axiom.

Nature of Social Resources

While each of these three axioms outlined above will later be used to derive a variety of propositions, they will first be used jointly to define and specify the nature of resources relevant to human behavior.

A4.0 Types and Nature of Resources: All socially relevant resources can be classified in terms of four categories implied by the previous axioms:

(l) Material objects   ) implied by Al.0
(2) Labor (activity)   ) implied by A1.0

(3) Knowledge and   ) implied by A2.0
    learned skills

(4) Evaluations:)
    approval and dis-   ) implied by A3.0
    approvals   )

4.l   Types of Labor: Labor can be further subdivided into two polar subcategories depending upon whether it provides relatively direct gratification by satisfying

8

interests or is aimed at indirectly satisfying interest by producing resources.

(l) Production of goods: labor that results in goods (material objects), knowledge and skills, or evaluations, i.e., resources; labor which produces gratifications indirectly by first producing some intermediary resources.

(2) Services: labor which tends to be immediately gratifying or depriving. Service can be further subdivided depending upon whether it is used to provide another person gratification or deprivation.

a. Personal services: sexual activity, body messages, servants, etc.

b. Force: attendants in mental hospitals, police, military, parents restraining children, etc.

Overview

So far the logical structure of the theory can be summarized in the following manner:

"human nature"   types of resources

A1.0

rudimentary   system   A3.0 ——————⟶ A4.0
concepts   concepts

A2.0

A connecting line indicates that an idea on the right has been derived from those on the left.

An overview of how the key axioms are interrelated is shown in Figure 1. "A. Individual Behavior and Experience" are seen as a function of the interaction between "B. Individual Propensities, Capacities, and Evaluation of an individual's experiences at a given point in time give his/her "E. Status and Role Set." This summed over time gives one "G. Biography" and "I. Personality." The summation of individual experience across individuals gives "F. Social Structure" which when summed over time gives "H. History" and "J. Culture."

The relationship between the major axioms are indicated by
                                    A4
the numbers on top of the arrows (e.g., B------- D). When axiom numbers are not indicated this means that that part of the theory remains undeveloped, but is included in order to provide a more systematic overview. A more detailed discussion of this model is provided in Appendix A.

Definitions, Axioms, and Selected Derivations

D=Definition

A=Axiom

Note: Definitions 1-5 are repeated from above for completeness.

D1   Interest (Ends): An input from the environment that produces gratification or
            prevents deprivation. Some interests are rooted in biological needs, but they are

largely shaped by past experience. (See A5.0)

D2   Resource (Means): An interest, potential interest, or a means of securing interests.

D3   Scarcity: A level of resources that an actor defines as less than optimal, i.e., the separation from gratifying inputs and outputs.

D4   Insecurity: The anticipation of deprivation most typically due to uncertainty about levels of scarcity in the future.

D5   (Human) Activity: A human attempt, i.e., an [intentional?] effort, to understand or transform some aspect of the environment; the primal source of human power. (Both understanding and transformation are achieved through sequences of separation, combination, and linking.)

D6   Typification: perceiving the world and structuring it by means of types and typologies; an essential and intrinsic aspect of the basic orientation of actors to their situations. It is important for structuring the "self," conceptualizing "roles," and as a necessary feature of institutionalization and the development of social structure. Typification is usually the first effort toward simplifying perceptions and achieving understanding.

A1.0   Gratification, Scarcity, and Insecurity: People, like all organisms, seek to maintain or increase their level of gratification by pursuing multiple interests through activity but they find this problematical because of scarcity and insecurity.

1.1   Organisms and material interest: Since human beings are physical organisms they require material inputs, e.g., food, and therefore insofar as they pursue survival they pursue material interests through activity

1.2   Quest for power and control: Human beings experience scarcity and insecurity as deprivation and seek to reduce it by activity aimed at controlling and manipulating their environment through the exercise of power and influence.

D6   Power: The ability to affect the environment in an intentional (see D23) way, i.e., the potential for effective activity. (In Gidden's terminology "transformative capacity" [1976:ll0]).

11

D7   Influence: The ability to affect the behavior of people in an intentional way, i.e., to exercise social power, by increasing dependencies and interdependencies.

         Note: The terminology of power and influence is, of course, a morass and therefore any usage necessarily contradicts many other usages. I have chosen to make social power and influence synonymous and define them very broadly rather than define them so that they necessarily imply inequality or exploitation. The concept of dominance is later introduced to deal with asymmetrical power.

D8   Labor: Instrumental purposeful activity.
    D8a   Play: Expressive purposeful activity
    D8b   Relaxation/rest: Expressive non-purposeful activity

D9   Capital: Stored and invested resources which can be used to produce other resources.

D10   Production: Reduction of scarcity through labor and the use of capital—usually involve the separation and recombination of existing resources into more useful resources.

    1.2.1 Propensity to engage in production: Because of their desire to reduce scarcity people engage in production.

    1.2.2 Propensity to save and invest: Because of their desire to reduce insecurity people have a propensity to save, and because of their desire to reduce scarcity through production, they have a propensity to invest some of these savings in capital.

D11   Dependence: When an actor's interests or resources are affected by the actions of another actor, i.e., when their interests are linked; autonomy is the obverse of dependence

D12   Interdependence: When dependence is to some degree mutual, though by no means necessarily symmetrical.

D13   Entropy: Randomness; the complete separation of a set of events, that is, the absence of events being combined or linked and hence the absence of regularities

and the impossibility of prediction.

D13a   Order: The obverse of entropy; events are linked and therefore there are (at least some) predictable regularities.

D14   Social Patterns: Actual or perceived regularities in social activities.

D15   Expectations: Patterns of activity which are anticipated because of their past regularity and predictability, i.e., the ability to perceive "if, then" links.

D16   Social Order: Interdependence based upon established expectations.
   1.2.3   Propensity to order: To the extent that people are interdependent they are a key source of each other's uncertainty and insecurity and therefore they are motivated to create a social order which will make each other's activities more predictable.

D17   Social Structure: The foundation, skeleton, or core principles which underlie, but do not completely determine, the pattern of social order, i.e., the units and links which are the central features of a social system.

D18   Norms: Shared expectations which
               (l) are positively or negatively evaluated, i.e., considered legitimate or illegitimate, and
               (2) serve as a key element or source of social structure.

   1.2.3.1   Conservatism and Anxiety: Because of the ability to remember and anticipate insecurity (see 2.l), people have a strong preference for actions which match familiar patterns. That is, unless new patterns offer an unambiguous, low risk, net gain in overall gratification, people tend to positively evaluate familiar typifications (see D3l) of behavior and therefore tend to transform expectations into norms.

   1.2.3.2   Habituation and Efficiency: Because
               (l) actions which have been repeated frequently in the past can usually be carried out with less effort than those which have not, and
               (2) consciously choosing between alternative courses of action requires time and energy behavior tends to become habituated.

13

1.2.3.3   Proclivity to Norms: Because

(l) humans have a high capacity to manipulate symbols and abstractions (A2.0),

(2) symbols communication usually requires fewer resources than physical activity, e.g., force (2.2).

(3) typifications increase the efficiency of symbol manipulation including communication (2.3), and

(4) the propensity to conservatism and habituation causes familiar typifications to be positively evaluated (l.3.3.1; 1.3.3.2).

therefore, most social order is structured by norms.

Note: This is not to imply that people share equally in determining what is approved and disapproved, only that they usually know what will be approved and disapproved and subsequently sanctioned. Most prisons are at least minimally orderly most of the time and norms—many imposed from above—play a crucial role in producing that order.

D19   Conformity: Activity which follows the pattern specified by the norm; deviance is the obverse of conformity.

D20   Sanctions: Activity that produces rewards (i.e., allowing or facilitating desired inputs and outputs) and punishments intended to shape or control activity by affecting one's interests or resources. Usually sanctions are preceded by the communication of expectations (or commands), though this is not always the case.

D21   Modes of Influence: Shaping and controlling people's behavior by one of the following modes of influence.

D21a Social Control: Sanctioning to gain conformity [the interaction or social system].

D21b "Institutionalization:" Shaping the social norms [the cultural system]

Note: Institutionalization is used in a much narrower sense than is usual. It refers only to influencing the dominant visible norms, e.g., via legislation, and not to the generalized internalization of the norms.

D21c Socialization: Shaping, i.e., influencing, people's interests and knowledge [personality system] (see A5.0).

14

1.2.4 Sanctioning Power: The power one has to influence people by means of sanctioning is dependent upon

>   (l) the level and combination of sanctioning resources one has (labor, material objects, approval-disapproval—see 4.1), and
>   (2) one's knowledge about which combination of sanctions is most effective against a particular actor.

1.2.5 Hierarchy of Influence: The three modes of influence (D21) form a hierarchy in that socialization assumes the ability to set norms, and the ability to set norms assumes the ability to gain conformity through effective sanctioning.

1.2.5.1   Lenski's "Force and Its Transformation": While force is the ultimate form of social control it is very costly and therefore inefficient as the sole or primary means of influence. Therefore, once organized opposition has been eliminated there is a tendency to shift the type of sanctions from force to material rewards to approval, and the mode of influence from social control to institutionalization to socialization.

D22   Organization: The exercise of influence to shape the social structures and processes in an intentional way in order to attain a goal (i.e., a cluster of interests).

>   Note: No assumption is made that the goals in an organization are shared by all or even most of its members. Participation in an organization and conformity to its norms is often and perhaps typically due to coercion or a utilitarian exchange relationship rather than commitment to "the organization's" (i.e., the elites') goals.

D23   Intentional: The attempt to produce a desired and anticipated, i.e., predicted outcome. Intentionality is always based upon some type of explanatory model rooted in a concatenated description (see 2.8 and Appendix B "On the Nature of Explanation"), however rudimentary or unstated. Intentionality is the combining of the ability to predict, to select, and to effect. (The first is rooted in the characteristics of A2, the second in A3, and the third in Al.)

1.2.6 Propensity to organize: In order to reduce scarcity and increase security people tend to organize themselves—especially to engage in production and maintain social order. Organization always involves the exercise of influence.

1.2.6.1   Means of Influence—Domination and Cooperation: Organization can be increased either by increasing domination or cooperation or various combinations of these in different realms of joint activity.

D24   Domination: Asymmetrical influence which with respect to sanctioning means making others dependent upon you for the satisfaction of their interest while minimizing your dependencies on them.

D25   Cooperation: Symmetrical influence which with respect to sanctioning means increasing mutual interdependencies, i.e., voluntary exchange.

D26   Concentration of Influence, i.e., (Social) Power: The degree of symmetry of influence ranging from pure domination to pure voluntary cooperation.

1.2.7 Propensities to domination and cooperation: Because of insecurity and scarcity people have propensities toward both domination and cooperation.

D27   1.2.7a   Directness (and Indirectness) of Influence: The average time between (1) the communication of expectations and the administration of sanctions, and (2) the desired conformity.

The greater the lapse of time, the more indirect the influence. With respect to the three modes of influence (see D21), socialization is more indirect than institutionalization (see D21B and the latter is more indirect than social control.

1.2.7.1   Determinants of Mode of Dominance: The more expressive (rather than instrumental) the relationship, the more intimate and private the group, and the less the past and anticipated scarcity and insecurity, then the more indirect will be the exercise of influence, (see D7 and l.2.5) and therefore the less manifest the exercise of dominance.
[Note: Play is a crucial form of expressive behavior and the research on this needs to be related to expressive behavior. Also see Robert Bellah, Religion in Human Evolution, pp. 70-91, esp. p. 89 on the "usefulness of uselessness."]

1.2.7.2   Propensity to Cooperation: The more expressive the relationship and the less the past and anticipated scarcity and insecurity, the greater the propensity to cooperation.

16

1.2.7.3   Primacy of Dominance: Because
(l) intimacy requires extremely high levels of time and resources for interpersonal interaction,
(2) expressive activity usually consumes resources without producing other resources though it may indirectly contribute to social solidarity.
(3) even in the richest social units scarcity is problematic, and
(4) the ability to abstract, which is the source of the ability for identification and solidarity, developed relatively late in the evolutionary process, and hence the quest for control is usually stronger than the capacity for identification; and therefore the propensity to dominance is typically stronger than the propensity to solidarity and cooperation. (This is another way of talking about "original sin."

1.2.7.4   Coalition Formation (e.g., Caplow's "two against one" arguments): In an attempt to exercise influence actors form coalitions (i.e., cooperate) both to exercise dominance and to resist it.

1.2.7.4.1   Strategies of Dominance--Coalitions: Actors who have mutual interests have a propensity to form coalitions, i.e., to cooperate, in order to dominate those with whom they have conflicts of interests.

1.2.7.4.2   Strategies of Defense--Counter-Coalitions: Those who are dominated by the same actor (including organized coalitions) have a mutual interest in resisting this domination and therefore a propensity to cooperate to form counter-coalitions.

1.2.7.5   Probabilities of Cooperation:
(l) The more indirect the available modes of influence (see D21, D27, and l.2.4.1),
(2) the greater the propensity to cooperation (l.2.4.2),
(3) the greater the probability of successful counter-coalitions then the higher the probability that organization will be based on cooperation rather than dominance.
[What democracy does is legitimate and protect the right to make counter coalitions.]

Note: The types of influence and compliance structures will be taken up under A4.

1.2.8 Mechanisms of Organization: The two principle mechanisms of organizing social structure are special cases of our rudimentary processes, i.e.,

(l) functional differentiation, i.e., the division of labor (separation-combination), and

(2) coordination (linking), e.g., hierarchies, markets, pluralism.

1.2.9 Modes of Organization: There are two fundamental and one supplemental modes of organization which are special cases of the modes of influence (see D2l):

(l) Specification of the structure (institutionalization) by the mechanisms of organization, i.e.,

  a) division of labor

  b) coordination, e.g., hierarchies, markets, pluralism

(2) Gaining compliance (social control)

  For a specification of the alternative means of gaining compliance see 4.2 and 4.5.l.

(3) Socialization, training, and selectivity of personnel: these are supplemental processes in the sense that they are utilized by many but not all organizations.

Organization is the intentional shaping of people's activity through these modes.

1.3 Declining Marginal Utility: Because interests are multiple (A1.0), the more any given interest is attained the less scarcity and insecurity that is experienced concerning that interest, and therefore the less valuable and desirable are additional increments of resources required to satisfy that interest.

1.3.1 Investment Preferences: The more scarce and flexible a resource, the greater the reluctance to invest it in long-term projects and the greater the propensity to find substitutes.

D28 Social Conflict: Sanctioning or threatening to sanction in such a way as to increase another actor's deprivation, or even destroy the other actor. (Social conflict is usually rooted in conflicts of interest, but this is not always the case, e.g., scapegoating.)

D29 Conflicts of Interest: When, because of interdependence (see D12), some actors' efforts to gratify themselves or increase their resources also increase the scarcity or

insecurity of other actors; mutuality of interests is the obverse of conflict of interests. Conflicts of interest are a special type of contradiction.

1.4   Scarcity, Insecurity, and Conflicts of Interests: The greater the scarcity and insecurity, the higher the probability of conflicts of interests.

1.5   Conflicts of Interest and Social Conflict: Because of people's propensity to gratification (from Al.0) and their quest for power and control (from 1.2), the greater the conflicts of interests the greater the probability of social conflict.

1.6   Organic Solidarity: Since people seek gratification and security, they attempt to stabilize relationships which provide them significant resources and/or gratifications. When this is true for both parties, the attempts to stabilize the relationship are mutually reinforcing. Therefore, the higher the levels of voluntary exchange based upon mutual interests the greater the ("organic") solidarity.

Note: This draws on Durkhiem's terminology where organic solidarity means solidarity rooted primarily in mutual interdependence due to division of labor and mechanical solidary is rooted in similarity, e.g., language, ethnicity, religion, etc.

1.6.1 Conflict of Interests and Solidarity: Conversely, the greater the conflicts of interest, the less the voluntary exchange and the lower the solidarity.

1.6.2 Conservatism and Solidarity: Because of conservatism (1.2.3.1) and because exchange increases common experiences (6.3.3), the more long-standing a voluntary exchange relationship, the greater the solidarity, that is, the greater the emergence of mechanical solidarity in addition to interdependence.

Note: See 2.7.4.l.2 for an explanation of why people frequently stabilize relationships--especially kinship relationships--which are not gratifying in any immediate sense.

A2.0 Human Capacities: Human beings have
           (l) only moderate physical prowess and a limited range within which these capacities can be expanded

19

(2) very great capacity to abstract, categorize and symbolize
(3) a large capacity to store (i.e., remember) and recall these abstractions, and a large but finite range within which these capacities can be utilized and expanded by education.

2.1 Abstraction and Interaction: Because of their ability to abstract, remember, and recall, humans can anticipate future experiences and therefore engage in interaction.

D30 Interaction: Acting in awareness of others, i.e., anticipating the probable response of others and taking this into account when choosing a course of action.

2.2 Propensity to Symbolic Influence: Because people prefer to use up their least scarce resource (from l.3.l) and because humans have greater symbolic-abstraction capacities than physical prowess (A2.0), humans have a propensity to substitute symbolic influence for manual activity when they produce roughly the same outcome; the greater their symbol-abstraction capacities have been developed, the less scarce it will be relative to other resources and therefore the greater will be this propensity.

2.2.1 Propensity to Symbolic Interaction: Humans tend to substitute symbolic interaction for physical force.

2.2.2 Propensity for Ideology: Humans tend to substitute ideology for violence. (See also l.2.5.l)

2.2.3 Preference for White Collar Work: Given adequate initial education, most, but not all, people prefer work which involves the manipulation of symbols rather than manual labor.

D31 Typification: Abstract categories that attempt to characterize the typical attributes—in statistical terms the central tendencies—of some population, and are then used to classify and categorize particular cases.

2.3 Propensity to Typification: Because even those individuals with very high symbolic capacities have limited capacities to store and recall abstractions (and because the array of human experiences is almost infinite) humans create relatively limited sets of categories which attempt to capture typical

20

experience, i.e., typifications. They do this by combining a wide array of perceptions that are in some respects similar and separating these from other perceptions that are dissimilar in that respect. Typification results from the pressure to simplify.

2.3.1 Deep structures: In the process of creating typifications people further simplify the construction, recall and linking of typifications by unconsciously selecting a very limited set of typifications as implicit models. Many other typifications will be formed as either analogs or oppositions to these "deep structures." Such deep structures will determine the content of (Sahlin's) "cultural reason."

2.4   Propensity to Label and Symbolize: To further simplify people tend to link the categories they have created with labels or signs, e.g., letters and words, for simplier and easier communication of categories.

2.5   Binary Oppositions: Because the combination of some perceptions to form a category necessarily implies separation of these from all other attributes, a binary opposition, e.g., X and not X, is the most rudimentary and least resource consuming form of categorization. Therefore, many—but not necessarily all—systems of categories are based upon binary oppositions or "nesting boxes" of binary oppositions, i.e., X ---> A and B; A ---> a and b, B ---> c and d; a ---> a' and b', b ---> c' and d'; etc.

2.5.1 Arbitrariness of Categorical Content and Generality of Categorical Structure: To a significant degree—but not completely—the perceptions that are combined into the first category of a binary opposition are arbitrary and random while the percepts which make up the second category are grouped together because of their contrast to the first category. Therefore the latent logical structure will be more similar across cultures than the categorical content.

2.5.2 Universality of Experience and Translation: All humans and human societies face certain universal problems, e.g., scarcity, reproduction, death, internal conflict, and therefore create many categories which are analogous, if not identical. Therefore, translation from one language to another is possible, though usually "something is lost" in the translation.

2.6   Semantic Circles: But because there is a significant degree of arbitrariness in the creation of categories and the assignment of signs and labels, conceptual

order and simplification can be maintained only by linking a whole system of categories in relatively consistent ways, i.e., by creating a "logic." That is, the content and boundaries of one category are specified by specifying its logical links (i.e., its similarities and differences) with other categories through the process of definition. A system of such definitions forms a semantic circle. Circles vary in their extensiveness (number of categories), interconnectedness, and degree of closedness. (The simplest circle is a tautological binary opposition, e.g., X and not X.)

D32   Closedness of Semantic Circles: The more the key attributes of a category are determined by its relationship to other categories of the circle the more closed is the circle. The simplest circle, a tautological binary opposition, is also the most closed: not X is defined solely in relation to X--and the meaning of one other category, i.e., "not."

2.6.1 The Closedness of Circles, Degrees of Freedom, and "Transformations": The more closed the circle the more a change in the boundary or content of one category will force a change in other categories—and especially in its binary opposite. That is, the fewer will be the degrees of freedom (in the mathematical sense) and therefore the greater will be the tendency toward transformations in the Levi-Strauss sense.

2.6.1.1   The Usefulness of Structuralism: Levi-Strauss type structural analyses are more likely to be fruitful in highly closed theoretical systems, e.g., mathematical equations, and myths of societies which are relatively culturally isolated and/or which have a strong sense of their distinctive identity, e.g., the Biblical Hebrews, than in the analysis of more practical and syncretic systems, e.g., the actual behavior of (Machiavelli's) princes or technological innovations in capitalist societies. That is, as Levi-Strauss claims, it is primarily a theory of superstructure, and most powerful in the analysis of relatively closed superstructures.

2.6.1.2   Structuralism and Cross-cultural Translations: Because structuralism will be most powerful in the analysis of relatively closed systems, the more powerful a structural analysis, the more difficult will be the translation of the content of categories into another system of categories.

2.6.1.2.1   Esoteric Languages: The meanings of higher mathematics, theoretical physics,

ideologies of highly isolated and alienated groups, and myths of isolated primitive societies (and formal sociological theories!) will be very difficult to translate into other languages but they will be amenable to structural analysis.

Note: The emphasis placed here on the efficacy of structuralism being increased when semantic circles are closed does not necessarily reject the contention that the regularities which are identified by structuralism are rooted in the nature of the human mind. It only suggests that "structures" will be most consistent in those areas of human endeavor where ideas are the least disturbed by either material factors or by ideas from other cultures. (This is the reason Levi-Strauss analyzes myths; they are less constrained by external "realities": animals can talk, humans can fly, etc.)

2.7   Meaning, Linkages, and Interpretation: Because the number of unambiguously distinct typifications that can be remembered is limited (2.0), typifications, e.g., words, are often given an array of meanings and connotations (e.g., Ricoeur's polysemy). The meaning intended is clarified through (1) the way words are linked together (i.e., syntagmatic location in a sentence), (2) the order and manner in which typifications (words and more complex clusters of meaning) are linked together in a text, (3) through the process of people linking themselves together during interpersonal interaction (i.e., establishing inter-subjectivity through dialogue), (4) through the way people are linked in the existing social structure (i.e., the implicit unconscious assumptions and clues characteristic of a particular social position, subculture, etc.), and (5) the way people are linked to other social structures (i.e., their sense of history of their own culture and their familiarity with other cultures).

2.7.1 De-linkages and Ambiguity: When any of these types of linkages is absent—familiarity with history or the social context, the possibility of dialogue, or syntagmatic order—the meaning of typifications becomes increasingly ambiguous.

2.7.1.1   Texts and ambiguity: The interpretation of texts is often problematic because the linkage of dialogue is always absent and one or more of the other links is frequently absent. The more removed the reader is from the historical period and culture of the writer the more problematic is interpretation.

23

D32a "Text": Any objectified record of meaning including written documents, recordings, computer tapes, or even highly standardized oral traditions.
"Discourse" is roughly synonymous with "text," but it implies a more ongoing process of communication. "Text" is probably easier to operationalize.

2.7.2 Linkages through Texts: Extensive linkages to the past or to other subgroups within a complex society are typically developed through texts. That is, in complex civilized societies we usually gain our knowledge about the past and about most sectors of the society through interpreting texts—including correspondence, newspapers, television, or highly standardized oral traditions—rather than through interpersonal dialogue or direct experience.

2.7.3 The Wider Hermeneutic Circle: Therefore the establishment of meanings often involves a dialectical circular process of establishing linkages through reading and writing texts and of interpreting the meaning of text from the linkages that have been established.

2.7.3.1 The Traditional Hermeneutic Circle: The meaning of any given part of a text is interpreted by the nature of its links to other parts of the text while the overall meaning of a text is determined by the way the various parts of the text are linked together.

2.7.4 Circularity of Identity Formation: The establishment of an identity of an actor—whether an individual or a social unit—is a special case of establishing the meaning of a typification through the circular process of linkage and interpretation. (At the individual level this notion is similar to Cooley's looking glass self.) [See Habermas, 1987, vol 2, 104-5]

2.7.4.1 Texts, dialogue, and identity: Texts and their interpretation and the critique of interpretation will be much more crucial to the identity formation of social units while interpersonal dialogue will be much more crucial to the identity formation of individuals—though both processes are relevant at both levels in complex societies.

2.7.4.1.1 Constitutions, histories, and autobiographies: Many organizations will create written statements defining their identity and basic operating assumptions, e.g., constitutions and—if they are relatively long-lived—

will have organizational histories written, but few individuals will write down personal creeds or write autobiographies.

2.7.4.l.2   Kinship, friendship, and coalitions of collectivities: The maintenance of long-term kinship and friendship links (i.e., extended interpersonal dialogues) will be important to identity maintenance in individuals—even when such links are costly and troublesome—while coalitions between macro social units will seldom be maintained if there is not a mutuality of interests. Frequently, the content of collective identities will change even if the names and labels do not, e.g. The Olympics, The Holy Roman Empire, pre- and post-Cold War NATO.

2.7.5 The Distortion of Interpretation and Public Discourse: Since interpretation is in part dependent upon the existence and nature of social links (2.7) the interpretation of meaning will be affected by the degree of conflict and ambiguity involved in these social links.

2.7.5.l   Individual psychological repression: When social relationships are crucial and yet inherently ambiguous (e.g., parent-child: affection and intimacy without sexuality, maintenance of strong identification with parent and creation of an autonomous identity for the child, initial subordination and later independence) the conscious and especially the public remembrance, and interpretation, of one's past, and consequently one's present identity and motivations, will be highly edited with many of the conflicts and hostilities repressed from public discourse. Attempts to more accurately reinterpret past relationships and present identities will be resisted.

2.7.5.l.l   "Madness" (e.g., psychosis, schizophrenia): When the ambiguities of linkages are so great that a reasonably consistent identity cannot be created even by editing, external links will be broken off and meaning will increasingly be constructed intrasubjectively rather than intersubjectively.

2.7.5.2   "False" class consciousness: When class relationships involve ambiguity (e.g., meritocracy and inheritance of private property; dominant classes providing crucial services and engaging in exploitation)—rather than simple repression—the interpretation of class relationships will be highly edited with many of the conflicts and hostilities repressed from public

discourse. And attempts to more accurately reinterpret past relationships and present identities will be resisted by both superordinate and subordinate groups.

2.8   Language and Symbolic Interaction: Because of
(l) the propensity to organize (l.2.6) which by definition increases the exercise of influence and interdependence (D22),
(2) the propensity to substitute symbolic influence for manual activity, e.g., unskilled labor, force, and violence (2.2),
(3) the propensity to simplify through typification (2.3) and labeling (2.4),
(4) the propensity to stabilize categories through semantic circles (2.6), and
(5) because meaning and identity formation necessarily involve hermeneutic circles (2.7.3),
humans create languages and transform most (but not all) interaction into symbolic interaction.

D33   Consensus: Agreement between actors about the linkages of typifications.

D33a   Cognitive Consensus: Agreement about descriptive typifications, i.e., about the linkages of semantic and hermeneutic circles.

D33b   Evaluative Consensus: Agreement about evaluative typifications, i.e., about the linkages between an array of interests.

2.8.1   Interaction and Cognitive Consensus: Symbolic interaction is dependent upon some initial cognitive consensus and subsequent interaction tends to increase cognitive consensus but not necessarily evaluative consensus (see 6.4).

D34   Knowledge: Past experiences summarized by abstractions, especially descriptive typifications. (Knowledge is a subcategory of the concept of ideas or thought which includes not only summarized past experiences, but also deductions and projections from knowledge, e.g., untested theories, fantasies, utopias, etc.)

D35   Language: A set of symbolized abstractions which are mutually understood and can be used to characterize a large array of past and anticipated experiences.

D36   Social Knowledge: Knowledge that is shared and transmitted by a language, a primary component of culture.

D37   Civilization: The objectification, storage and therefore accumulation of social knowledge by writing and other storage techniques.

2.9   The Limits of Social and Individual Knowledge: While the amount of knowledge which one person can learn is limited (2.0), the scope for increasing the level of social knowledge in a civilized society is practically infinite

2.9.1 Uncertainty and Mystery: This does not mean humans ever have or will fully understand the being/existence of the universe or themselves.

2.9.1.1   Religion: Consequently, people frequently acknowledge the inescapable uncertainty and mystery, as well as the limits of their powers, through various forms of religious ideas and rituals.

2.9.1.1.1   Modernization and religion: the more expansive knowledge systems of modern society may reduce the proclivity and frequency of religion, but it is unlikely to eliminate it.

2.9.2 Propensity to Explanations and Theories: Because
(l) the quest for power and control (l.2) usually leads to efforts to organize (l.2.6), and organization assumes explanatory models (see D23), and (2) the almost infinite scope of knowledge (2.8),
Humans tend to simplify their knowledge by
(l) typifying the frequency with which different phenomena--as specified by categories--occur together in time and space. That is, they link empirical regularities by observation and typify joint occurrences into correlations
(2) linking such correlations together into concatenated descriptions, i.e., by creating explanations
(3) summarize such explanations by logically linking them together by means of more abstract categories, i.e., by creating theories.

Note: The methodologies by which joint occurrences are determined are highly variable and the inter-observer reliability of observed links is therefore highly variable both across and within social units. Linking

events to the movement of heavenly bodies has been used in a number of cultures. A central effort of modern science is to increase this reliability.

A more extended discussion of the nature of explanation is included in Appendix B.

D38   Identification: Understanding of and empathy with another actor.

D39   Solidarity: Identification at the collective level.

2.10   Identification and Solidarity: Because people have the ability to abstract and imagine what it is like to be in another person's situation, social actors have a capacity to empathize with each other so that the gratifications and deprivations of others affect one's own gratifications and deprivations.

2.10.1   Consensus and Solidarity: The more similar are people's typifications, i.e., cognitive and evaluative consensus, the greater the likelihood of identification. (The more similar people's experiences, the more similar their typifications. See 5.1 below)

2.10.2   Cosmopolitanism and Identification: The greater the capacity of people to abstract, especially to subsume particularistic typifications, e.g., a given language, piece of knowledge, or concept of God, under more abstract conceptions, the greater the capacity to identify with those different from themselves.

D40   Evaluation: Comparing two or more items and ranking or establishing their relative value with respect to some evaluative norm.

A3.0   Propensity to Evaluation: Because of the propensity to gratification, and the ongoing process of coping with scarcity and insecurity (l.0), and because of their ability to abstract, typify and categorize, people have a strong propensity to typify and categorize perceived differences in terms of their potential for gratification and deprivation, i.e., they have a strong propensity for evaluation.

Note: Because of human beings' ability to identify (2.6) with others, things are not necessarily evaluated only in terms of the actor's immediate "self" interest.

28

3.1 Evaluations and Typifications: Evaluation requires comparison. Since people have limited capacity for remembering experiences and manipulating symbols (2.3), the typical patterns of behavior usually serve as the base of comparison and evaluation, i.e., as the evaluative norm. Therefore, the more an act deviates from the evaluative norm, i.e., typical pattern, the more highly (or lowly) evaluated the act.

D41 Status: The typification of evaluations of a given person, position, or social unit; the perception of how far they typically deviate from the evaluative norm; alter's perception of how much approval or disapproval ego typically should receive.

D42 Social Status: The typification of ego's status across an array of interacting alters, i.e., ego's status becomes relatively standardized within a specified group. To the extent that there is no consensus about norms of evaluation there can be no *social* status.

3.1.1 Source of Social Status: Social status is dependent upon perceived conformity and deviation to evaluative norms of a specified group and the subsequent sanctions of approval and disapproval.

Note: This does not imply that all sanctions (rewards and punishments) are related to conformity or even that the perceived conformity is authentic.

3.2 Typification of Status and Rewards: To the extent that the typical status and rewards of a position (or subgroup) are socially visible—i.e., are generally available as an evaluative norm—those who hold that position will tend to receive the typical status and rewards.

3.3 Evaluations of social relationships: Because of the propensity to gratification (l.0), social relationships are most frequently evaluated in terms of their effects on one's own resources and interest.

3.4 Associations and Status: Associating with others, especially in diffuse expressive relationships, implies approval and therefore mutually affects the status of those involved in the relationship.

3.4.1 Effect of Social Status on Associations: Because association implies approval (3.4) the more important social status is as a form of capital (see 4.4), the more

limited and carefully regulated are associations, that is:

3.4.l.l   the less the status inconsistency

3.4.l.2   the less the cross-group associations

3.4.l.3   the less the vertical mobility

3.4.l.4   the more normatively regulated are the exchange of goods and services.

3.4.2 Status Groups: The more significant status capital relative to other forms of capital the more salient status groups and the less the status inconsistency, cross-group associations, vertical mobility, and the more regulated exchanges, e.g., in

      3.4.2.l   caste systems

      3.4.2.2   racism

      3.4.2.3   teenage social cliques (but not teenage athletic teams where human capital rather than status capital is crucial).

A4.0 Types and nature of resources: All resources can be classified in terms of four categories implied by Al, A2, and A3

	implied by:
(l) "material" objects*	Al
(2) labor (activity)	Al
(3) knowledge and learned skills	A2
(4) evaluations: approvals and disapprovals	A3

*Note: The typology of resources presented here is simplified in several respects in order not to further complicate the exposition. Strictly speaking, the emphasis on material objects should be on "objects" rather than "material." For example, the plans for a new rocket or the formula for Coca Cola are primarily knowledge embodied in symbols on paper. However, they could be stolen by someone who had no ability whatsoever to comprehend the embodied knowledge and sold for large amounts of money or other resources. On the other hand, knowledge is frequently a valuable resource even if it is not

objectified in such a manner that it can be exchanged for other resources.

4.1   Types of labor: Labor can be further subdivided into two polar subcategories depending on whether it provides relatively direct gratification by satisfying interests or is aimed at indirectly satisfying interest by producing resources.

     (l) Production of goods (i.e., "material" objects), knowledge and skills, or evaluations: Labors which produce gratifications relatively indirectly by first producing some intermediary resource.

     (2) Service: Labor which tends to be immediately gratifying or depriving (to alter). Service can further be subdivided depending upon whether it is used to provide another person with gratifications or deprivations.

          a) Personal services: sexual activity, body massages, servants, etc.

          b) Force: force can be further divided into two categories depending upon whether it is used to directly physically restrain and manipulate another individual or as a sanction to hurt or destroy another.

               l) Restraint and control: attendants in mental institutions physically restraining a patient, parents when they are restraining rather than punishing children. [This does not primarily involve social interaction, but physical manipulation of an "object."

               2) Violence: police, punishment of children, military activity, fights.

4.2   Types of Sanctions: The types of resources also define the types of sanctions available for the exercise of influence, i.e.,

     (l) Services (labor)

          a) Personal service

          b) Force (especially violence)

     (2) "Material" rewards

     (3) Evaluations

          a) Expressions of approval or disapproval by others

          b) Self-evaluation

Note: Two clarifications are required:

     Knowledge, when it is embodied as an object, can be exchanged and therefore used as a sanction in the same way that any other "material" reward can. However, its more crucial role in the exercise of influence is improving the effectiveness of sanctions. For example, intelligence, i.e., knowledge, is highly important in military affairs but its primary purpose is to improve the

efficient use of other sanctions rather than as a sanction per se.

Self-evaluation can be used in the process of social influence, but it must be used indirectly by increasing the saliency of particular norms and the actor's consciousness of his/her nonconformity. This is frequently the role of ritual and especially religious ritual. The sequence of praise, confession, repentance, forgiveness, and rededication establishes the legitimacy of the rule giver, then the inadequacies of the believer, the healing of the breach between the divinity and the believer, and finally reestablishes the saliency of the norms—and therefore the power of self-evaluation to produce conformity. It is important to see that self-evaluation is a distinct process from influencing others by direct expressions of approval or disapproval.

4.3   Types of capital: There are five types of capital which parallel the four types of resources.

> (l) Material objects -----> Physical capital
> (2) Labor -----> Skill and strength: Motor skills and strength increased and developed by practice and exercise, e.g., gladiators, dancers, professional athletes, etc., invest many hours in developing and perfecting their manual abilities.
> (3) Knowledge and learning -----> Human capital
> (4) Evaluations -----> Social status or status capital
> (5) Social capital i.e., social networks, which   may provide any of the other types of resources.

Note: Developed skills and strength are usually collapsed together with knowledge and learning under the concept of human capital, but they are analytically distinct and in some cases this distinction is important, e.g., the relationship between years in the labor force and the human capital of lawyers as compared to professional athletes.

4.4   Substructure and superstructure: The four types of resources do form a hierarchy in the sense that each subsequent resource assumes the presence of the previous type of resource. The ability to evaluate assumes the ability to reliably distinguish between different values on variables, i.e., it assumes a type of knowledge. Knowledge assumes an active, laboring system (Al.0)—whether the labor manipulates material objects or symbols; a mind assumes an organism. Finally, an active system (p.6) assumes a material base; an organism assumes the presence of a specified array of

32

compounds and elements.

4.4.1 The conditional primacy of substructures and superstructures: the relationship between changes in the extent and organization of one "level" of the "hierarchy of resources" affects the extent and organization on another level is conditioned upon the degree of change and the extent to which the two levels are interdependent.

4.4.1.1 Primacy of substructures: In most cases large changes in the availability and organization of a more elemental level of resources will produce significant changes in subsequent types of resources, e.g., an increase or decline in the availability of cheap fuel is likely to produce changes in the organization of laboring. A significant change in the organization of labor is likely to produce changes in knowledge and values.

4.4.1.2 Primacy of superstructures: Cultural categories strongly influence the aspects of reality, including nature, which are (1) perceived and (2) defined as legitimate social resources. [Notes on Sahlin's Practical and Cultural Reason].

4.4.1.2.1 Perceptions: The knowledge that dogs, cows and pigs—their entrails as well as their muscles—or more or less equally good sources of animal protein is dependent upon the categories of modern science. Therefore these were not necessarily equally practical sources of nutrition for different cultures. Consequently, the rejection of one (or more) of these animals or "cuts" as a source of food is not necessarily due to the dominance of cultural reason over practical reason but to the cultural definition of the practical.

4.4.1.2.2 Normative regulation: Even in societies where it is known that these are all good sources of protein cultural reason may limit the use of one or more of these as a source of food, e.g., the rejection of pigs by many educated Jews and Muslims, dogs by virtually all Westerners.

4.4.1.2.3 The interaction of scarcity, practical reason, and cultural reason: Given an equal scarcity of protein (or other resources) cultures which have highly developed systems of practical reason, e.g., science, are more likely to relax restrictions on previously prohibited sources of protein. Conversely, given a roughly equal level of practical reason, the greater the scarcity the greater the likelihood that normative prohibitions will be relaxed.

4.4.l.2.3.1　Change in food patterns: In the highly modernized societies, previously rejected foods, e.g., entrails and soybeans, will increasingly be processed into acceptable forms of food, e.g., hot dogs, potted meat, "breakfast strips," etc.

4.4.l.2.3.2　Orthodoxy and stratification: Lower status groups, who face greater scarcity, will be less orthodox in their food patterns than higher status groups.

4.4.l.2.3.3　Extraordinary scarcity: During periods of extraordinary scarcity, e.g., war and famine, food patterns will become increasingly unorthodox and the more highly developed the level of practical reason the more this will be so.

4.4.2 Effect of superstructures: The extent to which changes in a "higher" form of resource will affect its substructure(s) will depend upon the power and efficacy of feedback loops, i.e., is there a dialectical relationship. For example, the degree to which labor affects the nature of the material resources will depend upon the amount of labor available, the efficiency with which it is organized, and how much of it is directed toward transformation of the material environment. Or the extent to which knowledge affects the organization of labor depends upon its availability and the institutional arrangements linking knowledge and labor.

4.4.2.l　Bell's axial principle of post-industrial societies: The more highly developed theoretical knowledge (availability of knowledge), and the more resources and functions given to universities, research centers, etc. (i.e., the institutional arrangements linking knowledge and labor), the more complex and rationalized the organization of work, i.e., laboring.

4.4.2.2　Meyer and Rowan ritualization of technology hypothesis: Those segments of superstructure that have the strongest feedback loops will become models which will be imitated by other less efficacious segments even when the effect of the imitated behavior on the substructure is weak or nonexistent.
　　　　　　(l) The social sciences will try to imitate the physical sciences.
　　　　　　(2) Mental health care facilities will closely model medical care facilities.
　　　　　　(3) Other professions will try to imitate the medical profession.

4.4.2.3   Weber's Protestant Ethic Thesis: Weber's Protestant Ethic can be conceptualized as a ("French") structuralist transformation or inversion of the deep structures of the superstructure which contributes to a parallel inversion of the economic substructure. The argument focuses on

> (l) the "distance" between the spiritual realm and the worldly realm—particularly on the strength of the "feedback loop" between morals (i.e., approved and disapproved patterns) and actual behavior; and
> (2) the emphasis on achievement and ascription as the means of reward in each of the two realms.
>
> In outline form the argument can be summarized in the following typologies:

I. "Distance" between Spiritual and Worldly Realm

	God-Person Relationship	Spiritual Ideals-Worldly Behavior
Medieval Catholicism	relatively low "social" distance	high incongruence
Calvinistic Protestantism	enormous (high) "social" distance	low incongruence

II. Reward System in Each Realm

	Spiritual Realm	Worldly Realm
Medieval Catholicism	salvation by works e.g. indulgences (Achievement)	rewards by "grace," e.g., aristocracy by birth (Ascription)
Calvinistic Protestantism	salvation by grace e.g. predestination (Ascription)	rewards by works e.g. via one's calling (Achievement)

In more detail:

A. An ideal-type characterization of medieval Catholic culture would include the following characteristics

   l. spiritual realm

       a. transcendence of deity: relatively low "social" distance between deity and believer with some emphasis on mysticism and the union of the deity and the believer

       b. mediators: many mediators available, e.g., Mary, the saints, the Church—in addition to Jesus Christ

       c. human power over spiritual realms: relatively high ability to manipulate spiritual realm (e.g., indulgences, prayers to saints for intercession, emphasis on miracles)

   2. congruence between spiritual and worldly realms: it is expected that the gap between spiritual ideals and actual behavior will be great i.e., there is a relatively weak link between norms and behavior

   3. worldly realm

       a. religious ritual: highly ordered and systematic (the Mass) and highly valued i.e., crucial to salvation

       b. individual motivations: conceptualized as irrational "passions" (A.O. Hirschman)

       c. status structure: emphasis ascription

       d. authority structures: emphasizes tradition as the source of legitimacy (David Little)

       e. economic activity: relatively unordered unsystematic and not highly valued i.e., the inverse of ritual

B. An ideal-type characterization of Calvinistic Protestantism

   l. spiritual realm

a. transcendence of deity: enormous "social" distance between deity and believer with rejection of mysticism and emphasis on the "otherness" of the deity

b. mediators: no mediators of any kind—except the one-time event of Jesus Christ's life, death and resurrection

c. human power over spiritual realms: humans are totally powerless to manipulate the spiritual realm (e.g., salvation by grace in the form of "double" predestination).

2. congruence between spiritual and worldly realms: it is expected that, while humans are always depraved sinners, there will be a high level of at least outward conformity between the spiritual ideals and the actual behavior i.e., there is a relatively strong link between norms and behavior.

3. worldly realm

a. religious ritual: less ordered and systematic and given lower value (i.e., not crucial to salvation) and de-emphasis on role of professional specialist (i.e., clergy).

b. individual motivations: increasingly conceptualized as the rational pursuit of interests (A.O. Hirschman)

c. status structure: increasing emphasis on achievement

d. authority structure: increasing emphasis and rationality as the source of legitimacy (David Little)

e. economic activity: increasing emphasis on ordered systematic activity that is increasingly given religious and social approval and an increasing emphasis on specialization and fulltime ("professional") occupational activity guided by cause-effect knowledge (i.e., the inverse of religious ritual).

D43   Alien: Physically separate from or logically contradictory to the identity of an actor.

4.5   The degree to which a resource is alien from (or to) actors will affect social processes and social structures.

4.5.1 Etzioni's compliance typology: The categories of Etzioni's compliance typology indicate variations in how alien a particular type of sanction is, i.e.,
(1)Force and violence are the most alien sanction: Coercive compliance structure.
(2)Objects are moderately alien: Utilitarian compliance structure.
(3)Evaluations are moderate to low in alienability: Normative compliance.

4.5.1.1Etzioni's Involvement Hypothesis: The level of involvement of subordinate personnel in an organization will be closely related to how alien the typical sanctions are, i.e.,
(l) Coercive compliance structure: when force and violence are the typical sanctions involvement will be very low.
(2)Utilitarian compliance structure: when objects are the typical sanction involvement will be moderate.
(3)Normative compliance structure:
a)Social normative power: when evaluations of others are the typical sanctions involvement will be high.
b) Pure normative power: when self-evaluations are the typical sanction involvement will be very high.

4.5.1.2.l Initiation rites and sexual play: When limited force and violence are used to create or support identities—as in initiation rites, mild hazing and sexual play—they are not alienating and do not produce low involvement.

4.5.1.2.2 Proclivity to suicide: When self-evaluations are consistently very negative involvement in life itself may become low and the likelihood of suicide increases.

4.5.2 Lenski's Survival and Death Hypothesis: According to Lenski (and many others) survival is the highest priority of most people most of the time and therefore death and threats of death (through force and violence) are the supreme sanction in human affairs. In the terms of the theory presented here this is so because death is usually the most alien to one's identity; death threatens nonidentity.

4.5.2.1   Exceptions which prove the rule: The less one's identity is tied solely to the

39

continuation of current historical existence the less alien death and the more likely one is to take actions which might result in one's own death.

4.5.2.1.1 Life-after-death: The stronger one's belief in a beneficent life after death the less the concern to avoid death.

4.5.2.1.2 Egoistic suicide (redefined): The more one is sure that an act will immortalize one's identity in the cultural history, the more likely one is to engage in such acts even if they may result in one's own death.

4.5.2.l.3 Anomic suicide: The less stable and integrated (i.e., logically consistent) one's current historical identity, the less threatening death is relative to a continuing historic existence in which identity formation and maintenance seem insoluble.

4.5.2.l.4 Altruistic suicide: The more one's own identity is dependent upon the identity of another, the more likely one is to sacrifice their own life to save the life of another.

4.5.2.l.5 Propensity to altruistic martyrdom: The greater the individual's capacity to identify with others and the more the individual defines this capacity as a key component of his/her identity, the more likely one is to commit altruistic suicide (holding constant the occurrence of situations in which such suicide is defined as appropriate).

4.5.3 Alienability of capital: The more a given type of capital resource is an integral part of one's identity the more inalienable it is. That is:
(l) Physical capital is the most alienable because it is composed of objects separable from the identities of other individuals and hence can be appropriated by force.
(2) Human capital is the least alienable because it is composed of skills embodied in ego's mind and bodies and cannot be easily appropriated.
(3) Status capital has an intermediate level of alienability because it is embodied in the minds of alters (rather than ego). Ego's capital may be changed by persuading alters to change their evaluation of ego, but status capital cannot be appropriated by force.

4.5.3.l Physical capital and centralization: Those with influence can both delegate and withdraw authority over physical capital—because it is relatively alienable. Therefore, the greater the significance of physical capital, the more centralized organizational hierarchies.

4.5.3.2   Human capital, centralization, and mobility: Because human capital is relatively inalienable and (from ego's perspective) mobile, the greater the significance of human capital, the less centralized organizational hierarchies and the greater the geographical and social mobility.

4.5.3.3   Status capital and mobility: Since status capital is dependent upon the evaluations of the alters in particular social systems, the less mobile are ego's resources. Therefore, the greater the significance of status capital (e.g., caste systems), the less the geographic and social mobility.

4.5.3.4   Alienability of capital and social stability: Because it is highly alienable physical capital can be easily appropriated by conquerors or economic competitors. Therefore there will be a tendency for elites to develop knowledge and status capital and to transform physical capital into these more inalienable forms of capital in order to better stabilize their social position and privilege.

4.5.3   Alienability of capital and suppression of impulse: The more a given type of capital is an integral part of one's identity the more its appropriation requires the suppression of impulses of the id.
(l) Human capital is usually acquired through long periods of disciplined learning or training and on the average requires the greatest suppression of one's impulses.
(2) Physical capital can be acquired through physical appropriation and does not inherently require any suppression of impulses.
(3) Status capital requires an intermediate suppression of impulses since it is rooted in behavioral (though not necessarily attitudinal) conformity to social norms.

4.5.3.4   Civilization and its discontents: The more important human capital, the longer and longer the period of preparation requiring suppression of impulses and the greater the likelihood of a sense of (Freudian) "discontent."

4.6   The expandability of capital; the level of resources and the level of conflict: Because higher levels of scarcity increase the probability of social conflict (from l.4 and l.5), levels of conflict and the incidence of violence over the control of capital will be highest in those societies that depend primarily upon types of capital that are difficult to expand.

4.6.l Levels of conflict and types of societies: The frequency of conflict and violence over the

control of capital will be greater in preindustrial societies because the basic types of capital—status and land—are relatively zero sum resources while in contrast physical and human capital can be expanded many fold.

Note: This does not necessarily apply to violence and conflict over other issues e.g., marital disputes and petty thievery. Moreover the damage that results from incidences of violence in industrial societies may be greater since the means of violence are more powerful.

4.6.1.1 Paige's theory of agrarian conflict: The more that non-cultivators are dependent upon land for income rather than other forms of capital, the greater the likelihood there will be violent class conflict with non-cultivators.
See Gilbert and Kahl 4h 3d p. 198 concerning mining

4.6.1.2   The nature of capital and the ideology of conflict—Hirschman's The Passions and the Interests: When capital is primarily a zero sum resource, e.g., status and land, scarcity and conflict will be defined in terms of the irrational pursuit of brute passions. As expandable forms of capital, e.g., machines become more significant, scarcity and conflict will be defined in terms of the rational pursuit of interests.

4.6.1.2.1 R. H. Turner's "From Institution to Impulse": As capital formation continues the level of resources available to gratify the impulses (or passions) increase, but there is greater and greater emphasis on the development of human capital—which requires the increased suppression of impulses—and therefore there is a return to a definition of self in terms of impulses among those subpopulation which have experienced extensive suppression of impulses in the process of acquiring human capital, but who have not experienced and do not anticipate scarcity of resources, e.g., children of the upper middle class in the 1960s.

4.6.1.2.2 Conservatism and Hedonism in the 1970s: If the problem economic scarcity becomes problematic such subpopulations are likely to redefine self so as to adopt elements of the institutional self in the public instrumental-production spheres of activity, but to adopt elements of the impulse self in private expressive-consumption spheres of activity. Ideology of "work hard, play hard."

4.7   The physical mobility of capital: Forms of capital can be ranked in terms of the ease with which it can be physically relocated:

l) physical capital
    a) land
    b) other forms of real estate, e.g., buildings
    c) machinery
    d) personal chattels
2) status capital
3) human capital

Note: The mobility of status capital and human capital are limited by the boundaries of the cultural system. Billy Graham's status is relevant to a much wider area than was Billy Sunday's. A physicist may be able to continue his work in a wide array of industrial societies but not in a simple horticultural society. Usually, however, human capital is more mobile than status capital. The average scientist can migrate (and move her/his capital resources) more easily than the average politician or a religious leader.

4.7.1 Moveable capital and geographical mobility: The more moveable a person's capital the greater the probability of that person being geographically mobile.

4.7.1.1 Refugees: During periods of persecution, the more moveable and intact one's capital, the greater the probability of migration holding constant how reprehensible one is to the majority, and relative rank: e.g., the top intellectuals are more likely to migrate than the top bankers, the top bankers more likely than merchants, the top merchants more likely than top landholders, the top doctors more likely than top lawyers.

Note: The above proposition does not imply that those with moveable capital can become integrated into their new home without difficulties.

4.7.1.2 Recalcitrant upper classes: The more immoveable the capital, e.g., agricultural land, of an upper class the more likely they are to resist a new distribution of wealth with violence, even when their cause is hopeless.

4.7.1.2.1 "European" farmers—settlers in "Southern Rhodesia" (now Zimbabwe) resisted change more than "European merchants" or professionals.

4.7.1.3 Education and migration: The higher the level of education a society, the higher the rates of geographical mobility. Probably more accurately, the higher the ratio of median education to the value of physical capital the higher the rates of geographical mobility.

43

A5.0   Significance of Experience: To the degree that they are not genetically determined, people's interests and resources, and especially their typifications, are created from their past, present, and anticipated experiences.

5.1   Effect of Similar and Differential Experience: The more similar are people's experiences, the more similar are their interests and resources and especially their typifications.

5.1.1 Consensus: The more similar are people's experiences, the greater the consensus among those people.

5.1.2 Mechanical Solidarity: The more similar are people's experiences the more similar their interests and resources, and especially their typifications, i.e., the greater the consensus, and therefore (from 2.6.1) the more likely is identification and "mechanical" solidarity.

5.1.3 Individual Status Attainment (Supply): The more similar are people's past positions and roles (and hence their resources), the more similar will be their present positions and roles.

5.2   Cosmopolitanism: The more varied are given individuals' experiences the more varied will be their interests and resources.

A6.0   Experience, Opportunity and Structure: Experiences are dependent upon the opportunity for their occurrence (Blau, 1977) and these are dependent upon the structure of the macro unit, and the processes linking its sub-units.

D44   Heterogeneity: The extent of differentiation into nominal groupings and the distribution across these groupings; the greater the number of nominal groupings and the more evenly distributed people are across the groups, the greater the heterogeneity; heterogeneity is a key structural characteristic affecting opportunity.

D45   Linkages: Movements, associations, memberships, and exchanges across differentiated subgroups.

6.1   Heterogeneity and Common Experience: The greater the heterogeneity the fewer the

44

opportunities for common experiences.

6.2   Heterogeneity and Exchange: The greater the heterogeneity, the greater the opportunity for exchange and cross-group links.

6.3   Linkages and Common Experiences: Linkages across differentiated sub-groups and positions increase common experiences for the larger group and decrease common experiences within the subgroup.

6.3.1 Mobility across subgroups increases common experiences for the group as a whole, and reduces common experiences within subgroups.

6.3.2 Cross-group associations, e.g., marriages and friendships, increase common experiences for the group as a whole, and reduce common experiences within subgroups.

6.3.3 Exchanges of resources across group boundaries, e.g., trade, increase the similarity of the types of resources available (though not necessarily the amount of resources held by each group), which increases their common experiences.

D46   Cross-cutting Statuses: A lack of correspondence between the differentiating statuses along two or more dimensions of differentiation. If all whites were also Protestants, Republicans, and white-collar workers this subgroup of people would have no cross-cutting statuses with respect to race, religion, party, and broad occupational group. The maximum number of cross-cutting statuses is obtained when there is no correspondence between these variables.

6.3.4 Multiple memberships in different subgroups and cross-cutting statuses increase common experiences for the group as a whole and decrease common experiences within subgroups.

6.3.5 Individual Status Attainment (Demand): The more similar are past and present opportunities, the more similar will be present positions and roles.

Note: A given individual's status is determined by both 5.l.3 and 6.3.5 <u>and</u> the interaction between these. That is, it is important not only that one receive a college degree or that there be high status jobs open for those with college degrees, but that such jobs be plentiful the year an individual enters the labor market.

6.4   Cross-cutting Status and the Structure of Interests: The greater the cross-cutting status the more cosmopolitan are experiences (from 5.2) and therefore the more cross-cutting and multiple are the interests of a given individual. Therefore the less significant for the individual are most specific interests.

6.4.1   Cross-cutting Statuses and Social Conflict: Since cross-cutting statuses reduce the intensity of any single interest, they reduce the significance of any single conflict of interest and in turn the probability of intense and prolonged social conflict. However, because the number of interests and linkages is increased, the probability of mild social conflict over limited specific interests also increases.

6.5   Interaction and Consensus: The greater the past interaction between two or more actors, the greater their common experiences, and therefore the greater cognitive consensus.

6.5.1   Short-run Effect on Value Consensus: In the short-run, interaction may primarily increase the mutual awareness of formerly latent conflicts of interest, and therefore may decrease evaluative consensus and solidarity (cognitive consensus; see 2.4.l).

6.5.2   Social conflict as a means of solidarity: Mild social conflicts (one mode of interaction) over relatively specific and limited conflicts of interests will produce a readjustment of mutual expectations (an aspect of consensus [2.4.l], but intense, prolonged social conflict involving generalized and fundamental interests reduces solidarity (see D39).

D43a   Non-antagonistic contradictions: when there is a high probability that over the long-run increased symbolic interaction will lead to greater consensus, i.e., toward combination.

D43b   Antagonistic contradictions: when there is a high probability that over the long run increased symbolic interaction will lead to less consensus, less solidarity, and the likelihood that one or more of the actors will attempt to use force and violence, i.e. toward separation.

6.5.2.1 Mao "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among The People:" Assuming that there are not antagonistic contradictions, greater solidarity between individuals or subgroups within a macro unit will require social conflict in order to resolve non-antagonistic contradictions as a precondition for greater solidarity. In Maoist terms greater solidarity requires that "The people unite, struggle, unite."

6.5.2.2   Mao (Lenin and Marx) on contradictions between enemies: When contradictions are fundamental and antagonistic compromise is pointless (except as a short term tactic). Where "enemies" are concerned "all power comes from the barrel of a gun."

Conclusion

This has been a very preliminary attempt to outline the main elements of a theory of social structure and process. It remains undeveloped in at least three senses. First, the current form of exposition is highly condensed. Second, considerable refinement and clarification of concepts and propositions is required. Third, specific theories relevant to particular substantive areas must be developed. It is the success or failure of this last activity that determines the usefulness of any more general theory and work in now proceeding on that endeavor.

APPENDIX A: DISCUSSION OF FIGURE l

<u>Model Of Micro and Macro Behavior and Structure</u>
>   This appendix provides a more detailed discussion of the implications of Figure l.

>   Determinants of Individual Behavior and Experience: In a sense a primal—though not necessarily the central—focus of any theory which attempts to avoid reifying macro structures must be on the behavior of individuals. This is the reason "<u>A. Individual Behavior and Experience</u>" is placed at the center of the model as it is outlined in Figure l. What is necessary is to indicate both the determinants of such individual behavior and how such behaviors combine to form the macro structure.

>   A basic assumption of the theory is that the determinants of individual behavior can be grouped into two categories. The first of these is labeled—for lack of a better term—"<u>B. Individual Attributes</u>." This refers to the individual's propensities (A1.0), capacities (A2.0), and morals or evaluations (A3.0). The second set of factors can be summarized under the concept of "<u>C. Opportunity Structure</u>." Individual behavior and experience are seen as a function of the interaction between the individual's propensities, capacities, and morals, and the opportunity structure.*

*This is hardly a new idea in sociology but often the most sophisticated research and modeling virtually ignores one set of these factors. For example, status attainment research until very recently has dealt with only the attributes of individuals and virtually ignored variations in opportunity structure.

>   As Figure l indicates, A6.0 deals with the relationship between the opportunity structure and individual behavior and

<div align="center">A6.0</div>

experience, i.e., C ------> A. But the figure also indicates

that A6.0 relates the opportunity structure to the "F. Social
>   A6.0

Structure," i.e., F ------> C. The reason that separate axioms are not provided for each of these two links in the model is that to a significant degree the opportunity structure is simply one facet of the macro social structure. An egg carton provides a simple analogy. The structure of the egg carton is the distribution or arrangement of the material, e.g., paper or plastic, that makes it up. The shape or structure of the material also forms an opportunity structure for egg storage. The usual carton can hold from zero to twelve eggs. It cannot hold more eggs unless we are willing to alter the structure of the carton or unless we are willing to alter the structure of the eggs—say by crushing them. This same kind of relationship exists between social structure, opportunity structure, and individual attributes: one facet of the social structure is the opportunity structure and it places limits on individual behavior. The degrees of freedom provided the individual by the opportunity structure can vary considerably depending on the nature of the social structure. (Just as the number of available slots to store eggs varies with the number of cartons, their size and the number of eggs already stored there.) But these degrees of freedom are limited unless we are willing to change the social structure or change the nature and "shape" of individuals. The simple point of this analogy is that separate axioms are not needed because the opportunity structure is simply one facet of

        A6.0   A6.0

the social structures; hence F -------> C -------> A.

Components of Macro Structure, History and Culture:

     Recent theoretical writings have stressed that social structure is an abstraction from the behavior of individuals (e.g., Collins, 1975); when people go home from the office the organization they work for ceases to exist until they return the next morning. There is a sense in which such an imagery is true, and is an appropriate antidote to reified macro concepts. But there is another sense in which it oversimplifies things. When people go home from the office they take with them a whole set of remembrances which very much affects their life while they are away from the organization. Moreover, a set of residues remains behind. For example, there are the buildings, machines, desks and other physical artifacts. Perhaps more important are the records left behind. Of particular importance are the records of resources that are not present in the place of work, e.g., the resources represented in checkbooks, bond certificates, accounts receivable, etc. The group of people who arrive at a place of work without having had a history of association and without the supporting residues is a far different social structure than those that do have such resources. Consequently, as conceptualized here, macro social structure is both the aggregate of individual behavior and the residues of resources that undergird that behavior. Keep in mind that resources (as conceptualized here) includes typified knowledge, and typified approvals and disapprovals. That is:

49

$$D \diagdown$$
$$\searrow F$$
$$A \diagup$$

where F is the macro social structure, A is the summation or aggregation of social behavior over individual people and D is the resources that are relevant to these people's social behavior.

Let me make it clear that I have no illusions that this formulation—as it now stands—is either satisfactory or adds in any significant way to the conventional understanding of the relationship between the micro and macro levels of analysis. The focus of the theory in its present form is primarily on the macro level of analysis. This is an attempt not to reify macro concepts and a very tentative statement about how the relationship between micro and macro is conceptualized. Axiom 5.0 attempts to make an initial beginning on stating some of these relationships. Propositions derived from A4.0 attempts to suggest how variations in the nature and levels of collective resources will influence the organization of social structure.

The concepts of "H. History" and "J. Culture" are added to the model simply to give it some closure by clarifying the nature of the feedback loop between macro concepts and the determinants of micro behavior. More specifically, the history of a collective unit is conceptualized as the aggregation of typified patterns of collective experience over some period of time. Culture is the residue of those experiences that are remembered or recorded at any given point in time. The social unit's resources at any given time are simply a facet of this residue from the past. Hence, F ----> H ----> J ----> D is the link between macro structure and the resources that serve as its base. An interesting footnote is that archeology is primarily an analysis of this sequence in reverse order. The residue of resources embodied in material objects is analyzed to reconstruct an unknown culture. This is then used to make inferences about a past social structure and perhaps even individual behavior. To the degree that there are artifacts from different time periods, attempts are also made to reconstruct historical sequences.

Individual Experience:

As previously indicated, the focus of the theory is on macro phenomenon, but in order to provide the model with additional closure I have suggested how the process of personality formation is in some senses analogous to the creation of historic culture. Both are primarily an aggregate of typifications which create identities. Such identities vary in the degree to which they have clear boundaries and the degree to which their various elements are logically integrated but the very concept of identity—and in turn culture and personality—implies some degree of boundaries and integration.

The notion of status or role set parallel the concept of social structure. It is the summation and typification of his/her usual everyday life. That is, $\Sigma A \dashrightarrow E$, where E is the

50

individual's role set and Σ A is the summation and typification of the individual's total array of experiences and activities for some relatively short time period—a week, a month, or a year. It is, so to speak, that person's particular slice of the social structure.

Likewise, the concept of biography parallels the concept of history and is the summation of an individual's role sets over a long period. Personality is the residue, at one point in time, left by this biography. It in turn makes up the nongenetically-based aspects of an individual's individual attributes, i.e., their propensities, capacities, and morals. These relationships are summarized as

A ----> E ----> G ----> I ----> B.

Summary:

The purpose of the above discussion is to give an overview of the theory and particularly to indicate the way in which different axioms are interrelated. Where there is no axiom number on top of an arrow linking two of the concepts in Figure l, this means that this aspect of the overall scheme is undeveloped. The major focus of the present endeavor is "F. Social Structure" and how "B. Individual Attributes," "C. Opportunity Structure," and "D. Resources" interact to shape that structure.

APPENDIX B

[Need to add discussion of the fact that actors constantly create their own theories and discuss the relationship between theorizing of the actors and theorizing of the social scientists. See Bourdieu, "Social Space and Symbolic Power," Sociological Theory, Spr. 1989.]

On the Nature of Explanation

In the course of outlining a substantive theory, it is neither possible nor desirable to provide an adequate discussion of the nature of explanation. However, it is increasingly apparent that social data are to a significant degree "theory impregnated" (Giddens, l976) and that in turn theories are to some degree philosophically and ethically impregnated. Therefore, it is appropriate to attempt to make explicit some of the assumptions concerning these matters. Moreover, I will argue that the rudimentary concepts that will serve as the primal elements of the substantive theory are also useful in understanding the nature of explanation. This is not accidental; explanation is a social process and a good sociological theory should help to elucidate the nature of that process.

Perhaps the most concise way of conceptualizing an explanation is to say that it is a "concatenated description" (Kaplan 1964). But for this definition to be very enlightening each of its component words requires elaboration.

A. Descriptive Categories: To describe something means to represent or give an account of it in words, i.e., in the categories of some language. The words necessary for such a description are created, in part, by separating and combining the multitude of sense perceptions into a finite—though very large number—of categories. "Reality" is broken up and different parts of it are given an identity and a name: "this is grass; those are trees." The process is analogous to (and probably a projection of) the identity creation and naming process in personality formation. A unit (e.g., person, object, or event) is created during social interaction by conceptually separating it from other units and giving it a name, i.e., a symbolic abbreviation of its identifying characteristics. Then units that are in some sense similar are combined together into more abstract categories that are likewise given an identity and a label: grass and trees are both plants. In short, language and the categories necessary for description can be seen as emerging from the basic process of separation and combination. It is important, however, to mention several points which have been given considerable attention in recent social theory.

Languages (and therefore the categories available for empirical descriptions) are socially created by groups. This has the following implications:
a) To some degree what we perceive and know is dependent upon the socially created categories that are available to describe our perceptions,
b) The world is obviously populated by a vast variety of differentiated (separated) groups. The categories that are available to a particular group are in part dependent upon the historical experiences of that group and especially the past and current distribution of power. These groups and their special vocabulary and meanings can range from pair relationships, e.g., the private language of lovers, to subgroups of scientists (e.g., Kuhn's paradigms), to whole cultures, e.g., Ruth Benedict's *Patterns of Culture*, or Gelfund et al "Tight and Loose Cultures."
c) Therefore, different cultures and subcultures will to some degree perceive reality differently.
d) The description of social phenomena is complicated not simply by the variability between groups in the categories available for description, but also because the very units of social reality which are to be described are socially constructed using language. For example, water is a phenomenon of importance in all societies and variations of social perception are to some degree limited by what contemporary Western culture would call the physical properties of water. In contrast, jazz singers, knights, and icons are social constructions relative to particular cultures and inextricably dependent upon the categories of language and social relations. Therefore the analysis and interpretation of social phenomenon always involve a "double hermeneutic" (Giddens, 1976:146).
e) The description of all phenomena—but especially social phenomena—is in part dependent

upon an interpretive process which involves both "skilled performances" of the actors and the use of implicit social understandings that are not explicitly embodied in the categories of the language (Garfinkel's breaching experiments 1967, Derrida's deferral of meaning 1976). "Reality" must continually be renegotiated.

f) Since the categories available for description are in part contingent upon (1) cultural relativity, (2) power relationships, (3) implicit interpretive clues rooted in specific social context, (4) interpretive and communicative competencies of the actors, and (5) a continual process of negotiation, there is a dynamic dialectical relationship between knowledge—as embodied in descriptions and explanations—and experience. Therefore all descriptions, explanations, and theories—and especially social theories—are to some degree socially and culturally relative and not simply representations of "objective" "real" phenomena.

But once having taken seriously the significance of language and its social basis in order to reject any kind of simple realism (and therefore any simple positivism per se), it is equally important to avoid a lapse into extreme nominalism and relativism. While the creation of meaning, including descriptions, may involve a "hermenuetic circle" such circles are by no means closed. Translations from one language to another may "lose something" but they do not lose everything. Moreover, power tends to resolve conflicting understandings of reality and creates a type of "objectivity." The most obvious example is in the case of political domination: Latin, Spanish, or English, as the case may be, becomes the dominant language of the empire and perhaps more important introduces new connotations into the languages of subordinated cultures. But perhaps more important is that the categories and descriptions of some languages—and the technologies derived from these—give their actors greater power of control over their physical and social environments. The spread of Western science and the incorporation of its concepts and words into the traditional languages of Asia and Africa can in part be explained by political domination, but in large measure it is due to the fact that the categories of science do give those who use them greater control over certain aspects of their environment. In this sense some "hermeneutic circles," (i.e., languages and systems of categories) are objectively more efficacious in accomplishing some goals than others. A corollary of this assertion is that the more instrumental—rather than expressive—the activity the greater will be the objective efficacy of one set of categories over another and the greater the tendency toward convergence. It is not accidental that the theories that have been most successful in developing cross-cultural generalizations have tended to focus on technology and economic production (e.g., Lenski, l966) while those who have been most impressed with the closedness of hermeneutic circles and the problematic nature of cross-cultural translation have tended to focus on religious, recreational and artistic activity (e.g., Geertz l973; Bellah l957).

One final "footnote" is required about the "logic" of different systems of categories. Pre-modern and non-Western modes of thought have sometimes been defined as illogical. At best this is a misnomer. Logic refers to the degree to which categories of meaning are used

consistently and without contradicting each other. While the degree of precision and consistency with which categories are used varies from one language to another, all languages are fundamentally logical. What varies is the criteria of logical adequacy, i.e., the rules about how relatively concrete categories should be combined into more abstract categories. This has been one of the central themes of Levi-Strauss's work (1962). Consequently, differences in the efficacy of varying systems of categories is due not so much to differences in how logical the various systems are, but rather to how useful the categories are in developing concatenations that allow empirical predictions. This brings us to the second major element of our definition of an explanation, but first let me summarize.

Description means that reality is represented by words (or word-like symbols) of some language. All languages are socially created and their use is dependent upon certain implicit understandings developed in the context of concrete social relationships. Moreover, the social reality which is to be described is socially created with language categories. Consequently, all descriptions—and therefore all explanations and theories—are to some degree culturally relative and rooted in a hermeneutic circle. But having acknowledged this, it is important not to overstate the case and to recognize that to a significant degree power—in a variety of forms—is an arbiter of differential understandings of reality. Consequently, an adequate epistemology for social theory will avoid both an overly simple realism and radical nominalism.

B. Modes of Concatenation: A concatenated description is one in which the various parts of the descriptive account are connected. One part of reality is made understandable by knowing its relationship to other aspects of reality. There are three different modes of concatenation, i.e., ways of connecting descriptions. These ways correspond to our rudimentary concepts of linking, on the one hand, and to combination-separation, on the other hand.

The first of these focuses on the empirically observed links between descriptive categories. If we observe a baseball flying over the fence of a ballpark we explain this phenomenon by linking it to a previous event in which a ball thrown at high velocity meets a bat swung with great force. If we carry the linking process further, we connect the thrown ball with the pitcher, the bat with the batter and place these in the context of a baseball game. Most common sense phenomenological explanations involve creating such linked descriptions. When we shift to more formal attempts of explanation, we focus on the reliability (and hence predictability) of the linkages in our description. In its typical form in social sciences this involves observing empirical correlation or in its classical form use of the methods of agreement and difference (see, e.g., J. S. Mill XXXX, Goode and Hatt, 1952).

The second mode of concatenation involves relating different levels of abstraction by the process of separating and combining descriptive categories. We might give the falling baseball a

54

more abstract common sense explanation by saying that it is a home run. Or we might abstract (separate) a more specific set of characteristics from the ball, e.g., mass and velocity, and classify (combination) the ball as a falling body that can be explained in terms of the laws of physics. It is this second mode of concatenation that is the core process in the creation of theories. It is the combination of this abstraction process with systematic observations about the links between descriptive categories, which are the basis of scientific explanations.

A third mode of concatenation occurs when we translate from one hermeneutic circle to another. Often social analysis involves such translation or interpretation, e.g., Geertz's *The Interpretation of Culture*, or Soler's "The Dietary Prohibitions of the Hebrews." Often the meaning in one code or idiom is implicit and obscure, as in dreams. Psychoanalytic analysis, for example, translates such dreams into another code. Including this kind of concatenation, removes further the clear-cut distinction between the analysis of meaning and the analysis of causation.   Some forms of analysis give higher value to particular modes of concatenation, but that does not necessarily mean that the other modes are wrong or untrue, but rather that each mode has both its uses and its limitation. Social action often involves and multiple modes of concatenation.

C. A Note on the Dialectic of Categories and Concatenations: Conventional methodologies seem to suggest a clear-cut distinction between the hermeneutic task of creating and interpreting categories and the nomological task of establishing theoretical and empirical concatenations— but this is not the case. While polar ideal-types of each can be defined, the two types of activity are inherently interrelated: we can perceive concatenations only by relying on categories, but we create categories only by noting clusters of concatenations that demand an identity, i.e., a categorical label. Here we have perhaps the most fundamental epistemological chicken and egg problem. A methodological debate developed in sociology several years ago which illustrates how these two processes (to some degree) form a continuum. This was the argument over the usefulness of what was called analytic induction (F. Znaniecki, l934; D. Cressy, l953; R. H. Turner, l953). It was not clear whether the technique was a means of developing valid explanations or primarily a means to clarify concepts. The debate and interest in the technique died out in large part because the question was not resolvable in the form that it was posed.

D. Styles of Explanation: The suggested notion of explanation is general enough to include a wide variety of explanatory and expository styles. The theory presented here is in the format of relatively formal deductive propositions. This does not imply that all theories must take this form or even that it is always the preferable style of theorizing. It does have the advantage of highlighting complicated webs of concatenation that sometimes become obscured by more discursive presentations. This style is used here because the primary purpose at hand is to give

an overview and highlight interrelationships rather than to fully develop any given aspect of the theory.

APPENDIX C

Building Blocks from Previous Theorizing

Not surprisingly different theoretical orientations have tended to emphasize different sets of variables. Theorists as diverse as Freud*,

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Parsons (l95l), Lenski (l966), and Collins (l975) have started with various axioms about human nature—which usually focus on people's propensities and capacities. From these axioms propositions about social behavior and social structure are deduced. A major variation within this approach is the debate between so-called conflict and consensus theorists. What is primarily at issue here are different assumptions about the extent to which individuals and groups have a propensity to coercion and conflict rather than a propensity to consensus and cooperation—and what conditions, if any, produce significant variations in these propensities. In contrast, theorists such as Simmel, to some degree Durkheim, Homans (l950) and Blau (l977), Black (1976) and network theorists (XXXX) have focuses not so much on human nature, but on the formal properties of the social structure, e.g., the number and size of human groups or the intensity of interaction. From their point of view the crucial determinants of variation in behavior are not so much individual propensities and capacities, but differences in the opportunity structure created by the formal attributes of the social structure. Moreover structural variations between social units are also analyzed primarily in terms of variations in these formal properties. (E.g., Caplow, l964.) "Orthodox" Marxists tend to see both of these approaches as dealing with secondary considerations; they emphasize the significance of the level and nature of resources as the "substructure" which shapes both the attributes of personalities and macro social structure. In contrast to this concern with "material factors" there is a long tradition which emphasizes the

importance of variations in cultural content, e.g., Weber, Parsons (1951), and Geertz (1973).

It has long been recognized that to a significant degree Weber transcends this debate over the relative importance of material and ideational factors. Perhaps this is most clearly recognized in his discussion of classes, status groups, and political parties. Many theorists have picked up on Weber's notions of multiple types of resources—e.g., all of the discussions of the dimensions of stratification—but perhaps the most useful application has been Etzioni's (1971) typology of compliance structures and its subsequent elaborations (e.g., 1965, 1968). A major aspect of the theory which follows involves deriving these categories, refining their conceptualization, and then drawing out some of the implications of the distinction. The intent is to take very seriously the human struggle for resources, but to avoid oversimplifying the kinds of resources that are important to people.

More recently the concern with cultural content has been linked to the more general issue of the significance of language, symbolic systems and cultural categories. Such factors are seen not only as important independent variables to explain the variations in other social phenomenon but rather as the very foundation stones which shape the perception and conceptualization of the phenomenon to be studied. The emphasis here is on "the social construction of reality", e.g., Berger and Luckmann (1967), Blumer (1969), and Garfinkel (1967). Bourdieu's work (1977a, 1977b, 1984) to some degree emphasizes the Marxist emphasis on the importance of capital resources. But it also stresses the importance of language, symbols and ideology in the production and reproduction of social structure and pays particular attention to the role that these play in maintaining structures of dominance. What has come to be known as structuralism also emphasizes the importance of symbol systems, and the social construction of reality but it tends to de-emphasize how these are related to domination. Moreover, it seeks to avoid a lapse into cultural relativism. Consequently, it looks for a common latent "structure" behind the widely varying socially constructed realities, i.e., for a common underlying logic which is relevant to all cultures. In some versions of structuralism the source of this common structure or logic is seen to be the nature of the human mind (Levi-Strauss, 1966). Chomsky's generative grammar seems to be a particular case of this strategy focusing on languages. Jung's archetypes are another possible example.

Related to the notion of the social construction of reality and a recurring issue through nearly all of social theory is the relationship between individuals and societal structures. It is probably fair to say that the dominant thrust in sociology has stressed how existing cultural and social structures shape the creation of individual personalities and behavior. While the social construction of reality perspective accepts this they want to emphasize (like both the "young Marx" and Weber's methodological writings) that macro structures are the aggregates and residues of individual behaviors and that they should not be reified and taken as given "realities." On the other hand, there would be no *human* beings it there were not groups with cultures that both pre-dated and outlasted the life of individuals. In that sense, neither groups nor individuals

57

should be reified. Their key point is that there is a dialectical relationship between individual behavior and collective structure. Among "classical" theorists, it is George Herbert Mead who best describes this dialectical emergence of the individual and rudimentary social structure: the creation of an individual identity, during the course of interpersonal interaction, and the structural linking of such individual identities through role relationships (Cooley is also an important contributor to this theme). The Meadian process of identity formation and linking role relationships of the "generalized other" are in some respects an example of ideas that have been developed on a much higher level of abstraction by other intellectual traditions. Identity formation can be seen as the most rudimentary form of social differentiation—a crucial theme in the institutional analyses of Marx, Weber, Durkheim, and Parsons to mention only the main examples. On the other hand, the linking of parts into a more complex system is a principle theme of general systems theory. A version of these Siamese twin themes of differentiation and linking will provide the rudimentary elements which will be used to synthesize these various theoretical themes and traditions.

Obviously this highly condensed overview of previous theorizing necessarily oversimplifies things. The intent is not to give an adequate summary of previous theory, but to indicate some of the traditions which are being drawn upon. The theory attempts to systematically relate at least key elements of the above approaches.

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Figure 1: Relationship Between Axioms and Key Concepts

a = members   ā = one type of activity carried out by a member

Read:
[Ea]...n] as: social structure, in part, equals the sum of behavior and experience over all members.
[Ed]...n] as: role set equals the sum of the various activities of an individual.
[If.t]...n] as: history equals the sum of remembered social structure over a specified period of time.
[If.t]...n] as: biography equals the sum of remembered role sets over a specified period of time.
[Residues of H at t$_n$] as: culture equals the residue of past history at a specified time.
[Residues of G, at t$_n$] as: personality equals the residue of past biography at a specified time.

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60