GENDER DIFFERENCES IN CITIZEN-LEVEL DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: A MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT: Scholars seeking to understand the gender basis of citizen incorporation into democratic politics have proceeded along two tracks. One, focusing on macro- and institutional phenomena, emphasizes the impact of economic development, modernization, culture, and collective action in determining the invocation of women's rights or the degree to which women participate in politics at the mass or elite level. The other, focusing on individual-level behavior and orientations, emphasizes the impact of demographic and psychological characteristics on gender differences. This article integrates the two tracks by investigating the gender basis of some key aspects of democratic citizenship through an analysis of the impact of gender on political knowledge, engagement, and satisfaction with democracy using cross-national analysis that first asks what difference gender makes in each country at the individual level, and then, seeks to account for the cross-national variation in the impact of gender.

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Gender differences in citizen-level democratic citizenship: A multilevel analysis

Gender has played a large role in the development of democratic citizenship. Almost without exception, as formal democratic rights have expanded and democratic institutional structures and practices have developed in countries around the world over the past two centuries, men have been included and incorporated faster than women, and men have been integrated into the day-to-day life of politics more than women. Scholarly interest in the linkage between democratic politics and practice on the one hand, and gender difference and equality, on the other, was reinvigorated by renewed and global debate over the meaning and nature of democracy sparked by the transformation struggles of former authoritarian states that began in the later 1980s.

Scholars seeking to understand the gender basis of citizen incorporation into democratic politics have proceeded along two tracks. One, focusing on macro- and institutional phenomena, emphasizes the impact of economic development, modernization, culture, and collective action such as social movements in determining the invocation of women's rights or the degree to which women participate in politics at the mass or elite level. The other, focusing on individual-level behavior and orientations, emphasizes the impact of demographic and psychological or personal characteristics on gender differences in political orientations and behavior. Unfortunately for puzzling out the larger story of gender and democratic politics, these two tracks rarely meet. This article integrates the two tracks by investigating the gender basis of some key aspects of democratic citizenship through an analysis of the impact of gender on political knowledge, engagement, and satisfaction with democracy using cross-national analysis that first asks what difference gender makes in each country at the individual level, and then, seeks to account for the cross-national variation in the impact of gender.
EXPLAINING THE GENDER BASIS OF DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP

Many historians have traced the different process and timing of democratization for women and men in different countries. There is, for example, a large literature on different aspects of the relationship between gender and American political development (Ryan 1992, Kerber 1998, Glenn 2002). But what is more important for our purposes than the experience of any particular country is the patterns that emerge across these studies, in specifically comparative research, and in insights of the more theoretical investigations of gender, democracy, and democratization. The political standing of women has conventionally borne little relevance to the degree to which any political system is defined as a democracy.

At least until the final decades of the 20th century, political systems did not have to extend basic political and civil rights to women in order to be designated “democratic.” In fact, because most countries extended citizenship rights and opportunities to men first, the early stages of democratization have tended to increase political and other forms of inequality between men and women. Even in the earliest, more optimistic period of recent change in Eastern Europe, reports suggested that "democratization" was maintaining and even enhancing gender inequality, perhaps not to the degree that it did when men but not women achieved democratic rights in the 18th and 19th century transformations, but nevertheless, creating a pattern that worried feminist activists worldwide (Einhorn 1993, Gal and Kligman 2000). In the great democracies of the world, the facts that women have conventionally seemed less active and engaged in politics, and that they have been only minutely represented among political leaders, seemed unproblematic for democracy. Studies of both political and legal theory and public opinion show there is no particular necessary relationship between women’s place in the polity and conceptions of democracy (Sapiro 1998).

A growing literature on gender and democratic theory has probed the question of why democratic theory has seemed so undisturbed by the absence of women. Part of the answer has to do with the historic
devaluation of women and "femininity" as such, but part also has to do with cultural notions of a public-private divide that excludes "private life," and much that is conventionally associated with women, from the public, and therefore political realm. The new theoretical literatures search for reformulations of democratic theory that might more adequately encompass women, femininity, and the political dimensions of the "private" realm (Dietz 1987; Phillips 1991, 1993; Lister 1997).

Complementary research employs the degree to which gender determines how active and involved citizens are in politics at the mass or elite level as an indicator of the impact of gender on democratic citizenship. Related work explores gender differences in a wide range of political orientations specifically relevant to the quality of citizenship, such as political knowledge, efficacy, and trust, but also attitudes toward gender equality. Even considering the tendency for scholars to be more successful in publishing research showing "differences" and "effects" rather than null findings, much of the evidence finds modest gender differences at best in political participation and orientations in established electoral democracies, and these tend to be variable cross-nationally (Inglehart 1981, Christy 1987, Inglehart and Norris 2003) and across time (Inglehart and Norris 2003, Sapiro 2003). But gender differences are widespread, and their variability across place and time demands explanation.

Most research attempting to explain empirically the appearance of gender difference in political participation or orientations that occur in a particular place at a particular time relies on a largely demographic model, although there are many variations. This approach views gender differentiation largely as a function of gender differences in the construction of social roles, resources, and opportunities: levels of education, family and employment status. The most thorough and sophisticated example of this approach is that undertaken by Nancy Burns, Kay Schlozman, and Sidney Verba (2001) in the United States. They found mixed results for conventional wisdom about the effects of some aspects of familial

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1 We are not concerned with gender differences in substantive political attitudes or orientations here (such as partisanship, political ideology, or militarism) although these are important for the broader problem of understanding the role of gender in politics. Here we are focusing on cognitions and orientations with
gender roles.

While Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001) emphasize gender differences in opportunities and resources as the explanation for participation differences, many researchers also temper their more demographic analyses with assumptions about the socialization effects of male and female experience that are difficult to test directly. For example, Burns, Schlozman, and Verba pursue the idea that motherhood might be relevant to citizen engagement and orientations because of the time it takes or what it does to women's social networks. Other scholars emphasize the potential impact of having children on a general orientation of "maternalism" or caring that could translate into substantive policy views such as antimilitarism or pro-social welfare attitudes. The problem is that few scholars incorporate socialized gender norms directly into their models as distinct from the roles themselves (Sapiro 1983). More often, socialized norms enter largely as untested claims about the nature of particular roles or demographic characteristics. These sometimes universalistic and certainly stereotypic claims about women's roles and character fly in the face of the variability of cross-national and historical political gender differences.

An increasing body of research takes the political, economic, and/or cultural context into account empirically in understanding the gender basis of citizenship orientations and behavior. Historical research shows how the structure of the state – even apart from laws and policies specifically aimed at transforming women's rights – has gender-specific impacts on the performance of citizenship at the mass level (Mettler 1998). Research on the gender basis of electoral choice demonstrates that the degree to which individuals' gender has an impact on choice depends on the political context (Sapiro and Conover 1997, Matland and Studlar 1998). There is relatively little analytical comparative research on gender and subjective citizenship that explicitly and empirically takes account of the institutional and contextual differences that might shape the gender basis of citizenship, although some looks at the impact of electoral rules and the structure of electoral systems (Welch and Studlar 1990, Jones and Navia 1999; Kenworthy and Malami 1999), and some considers the impact of a wider range of social and political
context on political attitudes and behavior (Banaszak and Plutzer 1993). Two recent comparative studies of the impact of gender on democratic citizenship and democratization that define the research frontiers in this area are Eileen McDonagh's (2002) on democratization and Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris's (2003) on political attitudes and behavior. Let us highlight their main features.

McDonagh starts with the observation that the existence of electoral democracy and systemic acceptance of basic liberal political principles do not themselves guarantee that women are incorporated into democratic politics to the same degree as men. Specifically, women may lag far behind in holding public office, although the gap varies substantially cross-nationally. McDonagh examines an array of commonly posited -- and some not so commonly posited -- hypotheses to explain the cross-national variation in the election of women to national parliaments in 190 countries. She considers the structure of electoral systems (whether they are parliamentary or have multi-member districts, both of which have conventionally been found to promote women as legislators), whether there is a monarchy open to women or not, whether there are state policies that award special benefits to women as well as a range of other contextual factors, including aggregate demographics. This work, including some investigation of interactions that consider different kinds of systems, reaches conclusions that call into question some conventional wisdom. Her broad conclusion is that there are two critical axes to look for in predicting women's integration into electoral leadership. One concerns state policies: Are there constitutionalized welfare provisions aimed specifically at women? The other concerns government institutions: Is there a monarchy open to women? McDonagh discovers what she calls a paradoxical finding: "Nations that paradoxically combine individual equality and group difference on either axis enhance the election of women to national office. Nations that combine individual equality and group difference on both axes, however, in effect, incorporate into the state a double paradox, as it were, and as such, do even better" (McDonagh 2002: 544).

Inglehart and Norris (2003) use pooled World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys
from 1981 to 2001 as well as macro-level contextual data to explain attitudes toward gender equality and women in politics as well as gender differences in political activism and ideology. They employ a modified modernization approach (focusing especially on political culture) that uses macro-level data to partition the sample into respondents in agrarian, industrial, and postindustrial countries and take account of generational change within that, while occasionally controlling for the basic demographic variables that are traditionally part of gender analysis. Their conclusion is that while modernization seems associated with increasing incorporation of women into politics, this is not just a matter of the effects of economic development, but has specifically to do with cultural change that is moving fastest in the postindustrial societies.

Both of these excellent forays into comparative research on the gender basis of democratization and democratic citizenship move well past the conventional parallel play model of comparison that shows columns of data about different countries and tries to tease out patterns by the "interocular" method. Both make important moves in the direction of integrating macro- and micro-level phenomena into understanding gender and politics, but neither really makes a tight link. We undertake that task here through a cross-national investigation of political knowledge, political engagement, and satisfaction with electoral democracy. We begin at the micro-level, examining within-country effects of gender in the context of a variation of the common demographic model that incorporates such predictors as education, age, marital status, and employment. If, as is the case, the impact of gender on these subjective aspects of democratic citizenship differs cross-nationally, the next step is to try to explain this variation. The appropriate predictors for such a task are not individual-level phenomena such as respondents' education, but country-level phenomena that tap the key elements of the major theories of macro-level gender difference, such as the level of economic and political development; the political, economic, and social status of women; aggregate cultural attitudes toward women; and the existence of public policy aimed at facilitating gender equality.
METHODS AND MEASURES

The data used in this analysis are drawn from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), a unique resource for engaging in comparative research on the nature of citizenship orientations. CSES is a collaborative program of cross-national research among election studies conducted in over fifty consolidated and emerging democracies. The goals of this program of research are threefold: to illuminate how electoral institutions condition the beliefs and behaviors of citizens with respect to the nature and quality of democratic choice as expressed through popular elections; to understand the nature of political and social cleavages and alignments; and to shed light on how citizens, living under diverse political arrangements, evaluate democratic institutions and processes. To this end, collaborating election studies, coordinated through a subset forming the planning committee, designed and implemented both a ten-minute common module to be integrated directly into each country's regular election study, and a macro-data instrument to be completed by each national election study and integrated with the micro-level data. Any of the world's national election studies was welcome to participate as long as it followed the guidelines of implementation. The target time period for this first round of CSES was 1996-2000.

Many aspects of these data make them attractive for comparative study of the nature of citizenship orientations. First, the project incorporates both micro-level survey data and macro-level data on the political and electoral systems, thus facilitating research that can take account of the political systems and institutional framework in which citizens live. Second, because this project is a collaboration among on-going national election studies, the conceptualization and design take advantage of a tremendous amount of comparative knowledge and expertise, as well as ensuring scholarly awareness and negotiation of the cross-national cultural differences that make "large-N" comparative research so

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2 Further information on CSES, including the data and all technical information including sampling procedures, response rates, and variations among the studies, can be found at http://www.umich.edu/~nes/cses/cses.htm/.
treacherous. Third, participation in the project is open to any country that can mount the study, thus while it is restricted to "electoral democracies," it is not otherwise restricted by region or type of system. The drawbacks of the data derive from some of these same aspects of their construction. Although the planning committee and research meetings of the collaborators devoted extensive effort to agreeing on the details of the instruments, their administration, and submission of the data, the collaborators are independent, autonomous national election studies and their participation is voluntary. The execution of the individual studies and the details of their data deposits are not precisely uniform. In some cases this presented problems for our approach to this analysis. We will note the most important deviations and some of their implications along the way.

Twenty countries form the basis for our analyses: twelve "consolidated" electoral democracies (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States), and eight emerging democracies formerly part of the Soviet Union and its East European satellites (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, and Ukraine). We have expanded the country basis of this study and our ability to test certain key conventional hypotheses by "undoing" the unification of Germany. Because part of the point is to consider the impact of the history of democratization, we consider the states of the former East and West Germany as two separate units.

Drawing theoretically-grounded conclusions from "large-N" comparative research requires specifying the collection of included countries as a theoretically meaningful population or a sample of a meaningful population. Although sampling theory requires defining the population before selecting

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3 This is not at all to say that these problems are resolved; simply that the conceptualization and implementation take account of extensive discussions at each turn among collaborating studies.
4 This is not the full set of countries with data deposited with CSES. First, we omitted those with fatal missing data flaws on key variables. As the analysis below indicates, there are cases in which we tolerated the absence of a variable in the model, in some cases the missing variable was too central to the analysis. In some cases the levels of missing data within some variables was too high for our comfort with the data. We then examined the remaining countries with the goal of creating a sample of arguable theoretical
representative units, it is possible to work "backward" to arrive at a convenience sample of a theoretically coherent population. In this case, we excluded a few countries with data available through CSES to construct a convenience sample of consolidated democracies and the new East European democracies. Given this description, disaggregating Germany does not just "add a case;" it serves the theoretical purposes well. Although this sample construction means that findings cannot simply be generalized to the newly developing democracies outside Europe, we believe that it is theoretically and empirically better to incorporate a guillotine that clearly distinguishes between what is included and excluded rather than having good representation from some regions and poor representation from others.

The dependent variables capture three important individual-level subjective bases of democratic citizenship, corresponding to its knowledge, attitudinal, and behavioral aspects. More specifically, we tapped political knowledge, indicating the degree to which individuals can be considered part of an informed citizenry; satisfaction with electoral democracy, indicating citizens' perceptions of the legitimacy and effectiveness of their electoral system of governance; and political engagement, or people's inclinations toward participation in that electoral system. Let us describe each further.

Political knowledge is constructed from a set of three questions asked in each country, with the number of correct answers summed to form the measure. The individual national election studies were instructed to develop a set of three political knowledge questions of their choosing that could be coded "correct/ incorrect/ don't know", and constructed so that there would be one "easy" question (that about two-thirds of the respondents would answer correctly), one "hard" question (that about one-third of the respondents would answer correctly), and a question that about half the respondents would answer correctly.\(^5\) Because the questions and the raw distributions varied across countries, we standardized the
coherece, as described below.

\(^5\)"Don't know" (DK) was treated as an incorrect answer. One limitation of these data is that not all countries specified "DK" in the conventional manner; in some countries "DK" was not distinguished from "not ascertained" (NA). In checking the marginals, we concluded that the vast majority of the "NA" notations were in fact "don't know" responses. In the national data files in which NA and DK were not
Standardizing within each country means that individual values on the political knowledge measure represent individuals’ level of knowledge relative to the average for their country.\textsuperscript{6}

Satisfaction with electoral democracy, the attitudinal facet of our investigation, was built from a factor analysis\textsuperscript{7} of responses to the following three questions:

In some countries, people believe their elections are conducted fairly. In other countries, people believe that their elections are conducted unfairly. Thinking of the last election in [country], where would you place it on this scale of one to five where one means that the last election was conducted fairly and five means that the last election was conducted unfairly?\textsuperscript{8}

Some people say that political parties in [country] care what ordinary people think. Others say that political parties in [country] don't care what ordinary people think. Using the scale on this card, (where one means that political parties care about what ordinary people think, and five means that they don't care what ordinary people think), where would you place yourself?

Some people say that no matter who people vote for, it won't make any difference to what happens. Others say that who people vote for can make a difference to what happens. Using the scale on this card, (where one means that voting won't make a difference to what happens and five means that voting can make a difference), where would you place yourself?

distinguished, we treated NA notations as DK responses, thus exchanging major inaccuracy and data loss for minor inaccuracy.  

\textsuperscript{6} It is therefore not possible to compare level of knowledge cross-nationally, but that is not the point. 

\textsuperscript{7} Specifically, we used a principle components analysis without rotation. 

\textsuperscript{8} This variable was missing for Australia, and is therefore represented with an imputed value, computed in the following manner: This variable was regressed on several other theoretically relevant attitudinal variables within a subsample composed of the data for the United States and New Zealand, the two most similar systems available here. The resulting regression coefficients were used to impute values for respondents in the Australian subsample.
Each of these variables was coded so that high values indicate greater satisfaction. The resulting variable is simply the sum of the three responses weighted by their factor loadings. This new variable is modestly correlated with responses to the more general question: "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]" ($r=.344$). By limiting our measure to those questions more specifically focused on parties and elections, we hoped to develop a cleaner operationalization of attitudes toward the electoral basis of the political system. We know that in most countries gender has historically made a large difference in people’s incorporation into democratic citizenship. Does gender make a difference in their satisfaction with electoral democracy?

**Political engagement**, the behavioral component of the analyses, is constructed from three questions:

1. Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?
2. During the past twelve months, have you had any contact with [a Member of Parliament/a Member of Congress] in any way?
3. Did you cast a ballot?

The questions do not constitute a measure of activity, but of involvement: a connection with a political party, communication with a public official, and participation in the basic act of voting. The factor analysis produced only one factor with an eigenvalue greater than one, and the political engagement variable is the sum of the three responses weighted by their factor loadings, so that higher values designate greater engagement.

Our first task is to explore the impact of gender on these three aspects of democratic citizenship at the micro-level. Because of the limitations of these data, we are not in a position to develop a full
explanatory model; instead, we explore a core demographic model with some elaboration. Gender is, of course, the primary independent variable of interest here. The other main independent variables – age, education, marital status, and labor force participation – constitute a set of demographic characteristics we expect to have a bearing on people's relationship to the political system and governmental actions and policies, and they constitute control variables to help identify the specific effects of gender. These independent variables are constructed such that being female, older, more educated, married, and in the labor force are coded "high."

In addition, the analysis of political engagement and satisfaction with electoral democracy includes one attitudinal independent variable, in which respondents were asked to assess the state of their economy.\textsuperscript{10} Assessments of the economy, of course, are likely to be among the most central elements in people's assessments of how well their political systems are working, and also to affect their political engagement.\textsuperscript{11} Positive assessments of the economy are coded "high."

To begin, we obtain separate least squares estimates of the individual-level effects within each country. This allows us both to examine the direct effects of gender on democratic citizenship controlling for the other predictors and to examine the variability of these effects across the countries. We then turn to analysis aimed at explaining cross-national variation in the impact of gender.

THE IMPACT OF GENDER ON DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: THE MICRO-LEVEL MODEL

Political Knowledge

We begin with the relationship of gender to an informed citizenry. To what degree does gender...
help shape political knowledge and the conditions under which it is gained? Most previous research finds women less informed about politics than men, and analysis of the data from this sample of countries evidences the same conclusion. In every country under consideration here, regression analysis employing the basic demographic model shows that gender has a statistically significant effect on knowledge, resulting in less political knowledge among women than men (Table 1). What is even more interesting, theoretically, for the purposes of comparative analysis, is the wide variation in the impact of gender on political knowledge, especially given that the independent variables are normed within each country. Thus, at the extremes, the impact of gender is nearly four times as great in Ukraine as it is in Australia.

Table 1 about here

Conventionally, scholars tend to "explain" this kind of parallel comparative analysis rather informally, by examining the ordering and clustering of countries for intuitive clues to similarity and difference. The simple array of results does not offer an obvious explanation for the differences among the countries; that will have to await direct analysis. The oldest, most stable democracies appear at both ends of the table; the former Soviet bloc countries are also distributed widely.

Before proceeding, we should note an important caveat in interpreting these results. A test of political knowledge does not simply test individuals' possession of knowledge; it also tests their confidence that they have the knowledge and their willingness to answer the questions, which in many cases, depends on their propensity to guess. Not surprisingly, some research (in the United States) shows that the tendency to respond "don't know" is not distributed randomly. Women and others with lower status or lower education are more likely than men and those with higher status or higher education to respond "don't know" under similar circumstances. Thus the man who guesses correctly gets a boost in his score for knowledge, while the woman who would have guessed correctly but shies away from guessing gets no increase in her score. Research looking at the relationship between gender and answering perceptions in two similar countries, the United States and New Zealand.
"don't know" to surveys of political attitudes shows that the gender differences are greatest at the lowest levels of subjective competence. They disappear among the most competent (Rapoport 1982). Because "don't knows" are crucial to the coding of the political knowledge questions, to understand the differences among countries in gender differentiation of knowledge, we would have to take account of cultural differences shaping people's propensity to answer knowledge questions when they are uncertain. In countries with relatively traditional gender norms requiring more display of modesty from women than men, gender differences displayed in Table 1 are likely to be more evenly composed of both differences in knowledge and differences in the willingness to make a verbal display of knowledge.

It is also possible that elements of political culture or social institutions or processes lead men and women "convert" education (or other social resources and experiences) into political knowledge to different degrees. Where politics is considered a distinctly masculine sphere, the implications of sheer level of education for men's and women's political knowledge are likely to be different; certainly where women face higher hurdles to become involved in politics education cannot be converted into participation in the same way. We examined this possibility by recreating the models discussed above, but including interaction terms for gender with each of the independent variables. The results show that, in general, education is linked to political knowledge in similar ways for men and women in the countries under consideration here, so this conversion hypothesis does not help as a general explanation of the results in Table 1. Indeed in two countries -- Hungary and Canada -- education is more linked to political knowledge among women than men (Hungary: $b=.107, p=.003$; Canada: $b=.112, p=.000$).

**Satisfaction with Electoral Democracy**

There has been relatively little investigation of women's attitudes toward democracy and democratization, although there is a large and diverse literature on the impact of democratization on women and gender. As we have seen, historical research has been very consistent in concluding that
democratization and the development of electoral democracy has generally included men before women, and has often led to increased gender differentiation and inequality, at least in the short term. But history also shows that gender inequality alone usually does not seem to provoke significant dissatisfaction with political regimes or the pace of change among women. As in other cases, such as class and race, "mere" inequality or differentiation based on social categorization is not sufficient to cause dissatisfaction with the system as a whole. The development of group consciousness, or group-based dissatisfactions with the political system is more complicated.

Thus, we turn to assessments of electoral democracy. Does gender affect the degree to which citizens in electoral democracies are satisfied with those electoral systems? Does gender mediate the sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with electoral systems and processes? Once again we offer a largely demographic model, this time supplemented with respondents' assessments of how well their economy is functioning, presumably one of the major criteria people use to determine whether their political systems are working well. The results appear in Table 2.

Table 2 about here

Gender has no direct effect on satisfaction with electoral democracy in most of the countries under investigation here. In four countries (Romania, Poland, Britain, and Slovenia) women were less satisfied than men, other things equal, and in two countries, Hungary and the United States, women were more satisfied than men. These differences do not suggest any obvious explanation, thus we await the country-level analysis to probe more deeply.

Political Engagement

Research generally finds women less active than men in politics at the mass level, although in some countries the differences have become small and are even disappearing with respect to some kinds of political activities. It is important to emphasize that the differences do depend on what kind of political
activity we are discussing. In the United States in the early 1990s, for example, Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001) found no significant gender differences in voting, protest activity, serving on a local board, or working in a campaign, but they did find gender differences in making campaign contributions, working informally in the community, contacting officials, and political organizational membership. Earlier research in the United States tended to find more gender differences. The existence and magnitude of gender differences in political participation varies cross-societally. Carol Christy's study of fourteen countries in the 1950s through 1970s suggested that gender differences in participation decreased with economic development, a hypothesis we can re-explore more directly in the macro-level phase of this research.

We assessed the impact of gender on political engagement using the basic demographic model supplemented with satisfaction with the state of the economy. As Table 3 shows, in half of the countries gender has no direct effect on political engagement, and in half women are less engaged than men, all things held equal. The set of countries in which gender differentiates engagement includes almost all of the emerging democracies in the sample, as Christy's (1987) work suggests. Still, the systematic macro-level analysis may help sort out the explanation for the patterns found here.

Table 3 about here

Summary: The Impact of Gender on Individual-level Citizenship

These preliminary results underscore the argument that single country studies cannot be used to generalize about universal meanings or impacts of gender in citizen orientations. Even though we find cross-national similarity in that women tend to be less knowledgeable about politics than are men, the degree to which this is true varies substantially. Countries varies in the degree to which gender had an impact on knowledge, they varied in whether there was an impact on engagement, and they varied in the direction of impact on satisfaction with democracy. Further directions for research at the micro-level
would best be carried out in a more detailed fashion with data that are richer with respect to each of the countries under investigation. But our next task takes us to a different level of analysis. Having explored the impact of gender on democratic citizenship in a range of countries, how can we explain the cross-national variation in the direct effects of gender?

EXPLAINING CROSS-NATIONAL VARIATION IN THE IMPACT OF GENDER: MEASURES AND METHODS

Can we account for cross-national variation in the direct effects of gender on democratic citizenship? In order to answer that question, we develop a multilevel model for each element of democratic citizenship incorporating a set of country-level political, cultural, economic, and social structural characteristics that could plausibly help explain the variation across countries. Multilevel, or hierarchical, models integrate information from multiple levels of analysis into a single model (Steenbergen and Jones 2002) In this case we can obtain within-country gender differences after controlling for a variety of other individual-level differences, and then model the remaining, systematic difference gender makes as a function of country-level characteristics. The hierarchical modeling approach is well suited for comparative research such as ours as it permits explicit testing of the generalizability of the findings by allowing for causal heterogeneity (Western 1998). In short, by including cross-level interactions, we can examine whether the effect of individual-level predictors, such as gender, are moderated by country-level contexts.

Measures

The literature on gender politics suggests a few alternative explanations of cross-national variation in the impact of gender on democratic citizenship orientations (Inglehart and Norris 2003). One revolves around the impact of economic development. Conventional modernization theories have long
argued that key aspects of economic development, including industrialization, urbanization, the growth of science and technology, and secularization, result in growing gender equality. There are contradictory theories, however. Given traditional gender-based norms in most societies, the fruits of development tend to be extended to men before women historically, resulting in increasing gender inequality in the early stages of development, a development that might be attenuated and perhaps erased only at later stages (Kabeer 1994, Sapiro 1998).

We include three indicators of economic development: real gross domestic product per capita (PPPS), the percentage of male workers employed in the service sector, and the number of scientists and engineers in research and development per million people. We use male service sector workers because in every country the percentage of women workers in the service sector is much higher than the percentage of male workers and does not vary as much cross-nationally regardless of its total size. The male service sector is a better indicator, and relatively unaffected by the degree of gender segregation in the labor force or the status of women's employment as such.

It is also plausible that a country's degree of political development and democratization would shape the impact of gender on democratic citizenship. We might expect more similarity in women's and men's citizenship in more democratic countries. There are also good reasons to doubt the existence of a clear, direct relationship between general political development and the impact of gender in subjective citizenship. In a sense, of course, democratization creates more dissimilarity among citizens at the mass level because there are more options for participation. The effects of political development, in fact, are likely to be very uneven and contingent on a wide variety of features of the political situation and on particular social groups' situations. It is certainly plausible that rising levels of democratization would provoke increasing dissatisfaction on the part of those left behind, including women, and further, that these effects would depend on political mobilization. Unfortunately we do not have the ability in this

12 Further explanation of these variables, including sources, is available in the Appendix.
study to consider all these possibilities, but we do test for basic relationships between political development and the impact of gender on democratic citizenship.

We include four variables under the heading of political development. Because the designation of political systems as democracies traditionally took account only of men's rights, "years of electoral democracy" is defined according to the introduction of general male suffrage, indicated by the first year in which parliamentary elections were held leading to an unbroken period up to the present. General male suffrage ignores the de facto or de jure exclusion of small minorities just as it ignores exclusion of women. An interruption of less than a decade due to invasion and direct control by an external power (e.g. the situation faced by the Netherlands during World War II) does not count as an interruption for our purposes. For countries with more than a century of electoral democracy, democracy is represented as beginning in 1900 in order not to give undue statistical weight to the oldest democracies.

The second political development variable, "Authoritarian History," indicates whether the country experienced an authoritarian period in the 20th century, again not including brief experiences imposed by invading forces. This offers another indicator of a country’s historical experience with democracy and self-rule. Because the former Soviet Union countries and satellites share a common distinctive authoritarian period, we also indicate which countries were part of "Soviet Bloc." Finally, we include a measure of each country’s civil liberties, an important element of democratic development, ranging from 1 to 4 with high values representing greater protection of freedoms.

Another aspect of the political system, not itself an indicator of political development or democratization, has often been attributed with a positive impact on women's political incorporation, especially as elected officials: proportional representation (Rule and Zimmerman 1994). Thus we include a dichotomous indicator of whether a country has some form of proportional representation in elections.

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This also allows us to construct a separate variable that specifically measures the length of time that women were incorporated into the electorate, regardless of whether that was at the same time as men or not.
for the national legislature.

It is also possible that the degree of impact of gender on subjective citizenship is a function of women's social situation, especially the degree of socio-economic equality. Thus, we included two variables tapping women's social resources, gender equality in education, indicated by the number of females per 100 males in third-level education, and female employment as a percentage of the labor force. It is important to note that our sample of countries contains relatively literate and well-educated populations by world standards, which means that to find real variation in education we had to set the standard high.14

Another aspect of women's situations that could affect gender basis of subjective citizenship is women's political context. Even if social resources are distributed equitably, equal political representation is not guaranteed, and it is reasonable to hypothesize that women's relative basic political orientations and resources are responsive to the context of their representation in politics and the responsiveness of the political system to them as citizens. The percentage of members in the lower house of parliament who are women expresses women's descriptive representation. The presence of a gender quota system for women's candidacies (including either a system imposed by law or one self-imposed by any party that has representation in parliament) points to a formal institutional commitment to women's incorporation into governance positions, while the level of parental leave benefits is one indicator of policy representation.

A final variable provides a country-level indicator of gender role ideology computed by taking the national mean on an additive scale using two questions about gender roles on the World Values Survey. The two questions are agree-disagree items: (1) “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.” (2) “Do you think that a woman has to have a child to be fulfilled, or is that

14 We explored other possibilities, more related to reproduction and health, such as the birthrate among women 15-19 and maternal mortality, but these provided no explanatory leverage at all because although they vary substantially world-wide, the degree of variation in our sample is relatively small. As well, if we had a wider range of countries, gender differences in literacy would be a more appropriate measure of education.
not necessary.” Thus, this cluster includes a measure of equality in parliamentary representation, a measure of policy response to women's social and political situation aimed at facilitating equality (McDonagh 2002), and an ideological or cultural measure of support for gender equality and integration (Inglehart and Norris 2003).

Finally, one cultural indicator has often been linked to gender integration and equality: religion. In this case, given the countries we are considering, we include a measure of the percentage of the population that identifies as Roman Catholic or Orthodox. These denominations are generally associated with greater restrictions on women (including in leadership positions within their own religious institutions and conservative gender norms).\(^{15}\)

**Methods**

For this analysis we merge together information collected at two levels – the individual and the country. We rely on a multilevel model to accommodate the distinct variability induced by each level. Individuals, of course, vary within a given country in their level of political knowledge, satisfaction with democracy, and political engagement, but they are also clustered within a particular country, and thus, share institutions, culture, histories, and economies. These shared contexts can cause dependency among the individual observations. Simply pooling the observations in a least-squares framework treats the individuals as if they were completely independent observations and naively exaggerates the sample size, thereby underestimating the standard errors (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Further, incorporating the macro-level variables in a traditional regression model vastly overstates the information we possess about the varying contexts, again underestimating the standard errors for these effects. Finally, cross-level interactions between the macro-level indicators, like economic development, and the individual-level variables, like gender, in a traditional regression model implies a deterministic relationship between the

\(^{15}\) With a broader sample of countries we also would have defined this variable as percentage Roman
macro-level variable and the magnitude of the individual-level coefficient, which is surely an incorrect assumption.

Multilevel models, by contrast, do not assume that observations are independent within contexts or that relationships are fixed over different contexts. The full model is generally specified by first setting up an equation for the lowest level (level-1) variables, in our case, for the individual-level components of democratic citizenship. Thus, our level-1 model for political knowledge is, as in our earlier analysis:

\[
Knowledge_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{gender}_{ij} + \beta_2 \text{age}_{ij} + \beta_3 \text{education}_{ij} + \beta_4 \text{married}_{ij} + \beta_5 \text{employed}_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}
\] (1)

Here, the subscript “i” indexes individuals, and the subscript “j” indexes countries indicating that the coefficients are allowed to vary across contexts. As our main theoretical concern is to understand the varying impact of gender, we focus on the variability only of the intercept and the coefficient on gender. Because we hope to explain some of the variation across contexts a second set of equations are specified, where the coefficients become the left-hand-side variable to be modeled as a function of country-level characteristics. For instance, to posit the variability across countries in both the intercept (the conditional mean of knowledge) and the coefficient on gender as a function of economic development, the level-2 equations become:

\[
\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{0j} \text{Economic Development}_{j} + u_{0j}
\] (2)

\[
\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{1j} \text{Economic Development}_{j} + u_{1j}
\] (3)

Here, equation 2 models the influence of economic development on cross-national differences in average levels of political knowledge while equation 3 models the interaction between economic development and gender. Note that both equations contain disturbance terms to estimate the remaining variation across contexts after accounting for any systematic variation due to differences in economic Catholic, Orthodox, Islamic, or, to account for the case of Israel, Orthodox Judaism.
Substituting the level-2 equations into the level-1 equation produces the full multilevel model:

\[
Knowledge_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} Econ\ Dev_j + \gamma_{10} Gender_j + \gamma_{11} Econ\ Dev_j \times Gender_j + \beta_2 age_j + \beta_3 education_j + \beta_4 married_j + \beta_5 employed_j + u_{0j} + u_{1j} Gender_j + \varepsilon_{ij}
\]  

The full equation makes clearer the complex error structure of the multilevel model, which cannot be estimated with ordinary least squares. Instead, the estimates obtained are maximum likelihood estimates.\(^{16}\)

Comparative cross-national research using the country as the unit of analysis is afflicted by numerous difficulties posed by the usually small number of cases available. With only twenty-two cases, the available degrees of freedom decline rapidly as we include multiple level-2 variables simultaneously. In order to sort out the separate influences of these characteristics more clearly and build more reliable measures of the characteristics, we created several scaled variables representing each general explanation we have identified. The three economic development indicators – GDP per capita, male workers in the service sector, and number of scientists and engineers – were standardized and summed to create a global Economic Development measure (\(\alpha = .82\)). The measures of Political Development – years of electoral democracy, presence of an authoritarian period in the last century, whether the country was part of the former Soviet bloc, and civil liberties – scaled reliably as well (\(\alpha = .96\)). Female employment and education were standardized and added together to create a scale representing Women’s Social Resources (\(\alpha = .46\)). And the variables discussed above as the cluster defining Women’s Political Context were standardized and summed to form the final measure (\(\alpha = .66\)). Initially, we incorporate each scale separately into the multilevel model for each component of democratic citizenship, and then estimate a final set of models that includes each scale simultaneously along with the dichotomous indicator of

\(^{16}\) The estimates are technically Restricted Maximum-Likelihood estimates, which produce less biased, more conservative estimates of the variance components given small samples of level-2 units (Pinheiro...
proportional representation and the measure of percent of the population that is Catholic or Orthodox.

**CROSS-NATIONAL VARIATION OF THE IMPACT OF GENDER: MULTILEVEL MODELS**

We saw in the micro-level analysis that the impact of gender on democratic citizenship varied cross-nationally. Our first step here is to estimate the variability of these effects. Thus, we begin with a baseline model that excludes the country-level variables, but provides an estimate of the variance of the micro-level coefficients (the variance component). In the model for each component of democratic citizenship, the variance of the random effect for gender and for the intercept was statistically significant, reaffirming that the influence of gender on democratic citizenship varies systematically across the countries in the sample.\(^{17}\)

The first phase of this analysis showed that the impact of gender on subjective democratic citizenship depended on the particular aspect (knowledge, satisfaction, engagement) and varied by country. Tables 4 through 6 examine the degree to which our macro-level indicators help explain the cross-national variation in the impact of gender on political knowledge, satisfaction with electoral democracy, and political engagement, respectively. Our main conclusions are that the results vary across the different aspects of democratic citizenship; more specifically, several of these country characteristics are useful for helping to understand cross-national variation in the impact of gender on political knowledge, only economic development and religiosity provide much purchase on understanding cross-national variation in the impact of gender on satisfaction, and only the indicator of religion accounts for systematic variation in the impact of gender on engagement.

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\(^{17}\) For political knowledge, the variance component of gender was .009 (chi-square = 82.23; p < .0001). For satisfaction with electoral democracy, the variance component of gender was .004 (chi-square = 33.73; p < .0001). For political engagement, the variance component of gender was .007 (chi-square = 61.84; p < .0001).
Political Knowledge

The earlier analysis revealed that after taking the basic socio-demographic model into account, gender had an effect, though a variable one, on political knowledge in all countries in our sample such that women were less knowledgeable than men. Table 4 suggests that political development, proportional representation and religion are each related to this variation. The positive and significant coefficient for the cross-level interaction between gender and the political development scale means that in countries with a longer democratic history, no recent authoritarianism, and greater protections of civil liberties the knowledge gap is smaller. Indeed, in other analysis (not shown), each element of the index was included separately, and all but a countries status as formerly part of the Soviet Union was significantly related to the size of the gender gap. The negative and significant coefficient for the interaction between gender and the percent Catholic or Orthodox, on the other hand, indicates that as the proportion of the population who identify as Catholic or Orthodox increases, the gap in knowledge increases as well, consistent with Inglehart and Norris’ cultural hypothesis. In addition, the gender gap in knowledge is greater in systems of proportional representation, those in which, ironically, women tend to do better as parliamentary candidates, though this effect is statistically significant only at the .10 level. The inclusion of each of these variables results in a reduction in the variability of the gender coefficient across contexts, as indicated by the smaller, though statistically significant, magnitude of the variance component for this effect.

While the index for women’s political context is not significantly related to the variation in the impact of gender on knowledge, in separate analysis (not shown) some of the elements of the scale were related. As we might expect, where the national mass culture supports more integrated, egalitarian gender roles, the political knowledge gap is smaller (the coefficient of the interaction between gender ideology

\[18\] The positive coefficient works in opposition to the generally negative effect of gender.
and gender was .082, \( p < .0066 \). In countries with more generous parental leave benefits, however, the knowledge gap is larger (the coefficient of the interaction is -.089, \( p < .0001 \)). Because these effects serve to cancel one another out, the scale for women’s political context overall does not appear systematically related to the impact of gender. Of course the point is not that parental leave policies affect knowledge, but that these policies represent an underlying aspect of the gender policy culture (McDonagh 2002).

It is also interesting to note specific variables that do not have an impact on the knowledge gap, in part to underscore the difference between micro- and macro-level analyses of gender difference. While education and employment have an impact on political knowledge among both men and women in all countries at the individual level, Table 4 shows that gender integration of higher education and the labor force, subsumed in the scale for women’s social resources, are unrelated to the size of the political knowledge gap. We have by no means ruled out the possibility that in a wider range of countries, with less educational or employment equality, and less equality in basic literacy, these resources would do more to predict variation in the political knowledge gap. We note also economic phenomena such as those included in the economic development scale do not help explain variation in the impact of gender on political knowledge, though the effect is in the appropriately positive direction.

When the macro variables are introduced together into the model, however, the results change (see the final column in Table 4). Religion and proportional representation retain their previously negative and significant relationship with the gender gap in knowledge controlling for these other contexts. But in this same full model analysis, political development drops out of the picture and economic development emerges as having a clear inverse relationship with the size of gender differences in political knowledge. Of course, several of these nation-level characteristics are highly correlated, most notably economic and political development (\( r = .77 \)), so the *ceteris paribus* caveat is particularly important in reading these results.
Satisfaction with Electoral Democracy

With respect to satisfaction with electoral democracy, only two variables emerge as modestly statistically significantly related to the variation in the impact of gender. Women are less satisfied relative to men in countries with less economic development and in countries with higher Catholic and Orthodox populations. Of course, as the baseline models indicate, there is less cross-national variation in the impact of gender on satisfaction with democracy to begin with, compared to the knowledge and engagement gaps.\(^{19}\) The last column of Table 5 provides the estimates for the full multilevel model, including each of the macro-variables simultaneously. Only economic development retains a modestly significant effect on gender differences in satisfaction with electoral democracy.

Table 5 about here

Political Engagement

Finally, although the impact of gender varies quite a bit cross-nationally, we are unsuccessful in explaining this variation with the models at hand. While the interactions between gender and economic development, political development, and women’s social and political contexts are all positively signed, none explain any significant variation in the gender gap for engagement. Religion appears modestly related, to the presence of gender differences in engagement in the model analysis without controls; the percentage of Catholic and Orthodox adherents is relatively high, gender differences in political engagement are greater, with women relatively less engaged than men. When the country-level characteristics are included together, none of the variables we have included have an impact. Because mobilization and recruitment are so important in the degree to which people participate in politics (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), this leads us to suspect that cross-national variation in gender differences in

\(^{19}\) The baseline effect of gender represents the impact of gender when the macro-level variable equals zero. This is essentially the difference gender makes for a country with an average value of economic development, political development, etc.
political engagement may be accounted for by something we cannot tap here: the degree to which political organizations, parties, and activists attempt to recruit and mobilize women as compared with men in the normal course of electoral politics.

Table 6 about here

Once again, it is worth emphasizing what does not emerge from this analysis, in contrast with both individual-level analysis, but also studies of other aspects of political integration of women. Gender quotas are linked to higher numbers of women among elected leaders, but neither quotas nor higher descriptive representation (nor any characteristic of women’s political context among those we have included) have an impact on political engagement at the mass level. Economic and educational resources boost political engagement at the individual level, but macro-level educational and economic resources do not have an effect on the degree to which gender structures the level of political engagement in a country as a whole.

CONCLUSIONS: THE IMPACT OF GENDER IN CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Single-country studies of the impact of gender on political orientations and behavior are extremely useful for many purposes. All too often, however, they are used to make broad generalizations about the nature of gender and its impact in some universalized sense. Gender politics scholars have long argued that gender effects should not be understood in terms that are any more universalistic than are the effects of other kinds of group membership. Students of comparative politics have long argued that it is important to take account of the variation in both cultural and institutional contexts to understand the impact of gender on citizenship orientations and behavior. By cultural and institutional contexts we mean the differences we find at the macro-level that shape the nature and impact of gender.

Our research proceeded at two levels. The first involved the “parallel play” of investigating the utility of a socio-demographic model for isolating the impact of gender on political knowledge,
engagement, and satisfaction with democracy. After accounting for such things as education, age, and in the case of satisfaction and engagement, perceptions of the economy, we found that gender has effects on these political variables, but the effects depend on both the country and what, exactly the question is. We did not expect to find universals, and we did not find them. We also did further analysis by partitioning the country samples by gender to see whether the socio-demographic models worked the same way for men and women (not shown). Although they did in broad terms, it is also clear that the utility of these models depends on the country and what particular aspect of citizenship we are investigating.

Thus, the second phase of this study selected macro-level variables suggested by the literature on gender politics (and variables that were actually available and varied across the countries in our sample) to see whether we can account for the types of cross-national variation we found. Both our ability to explain cross-national variance and the particular variables that contributed significantly to that explanation depended, again, on the question. Clearly this analysis was least successful in the case of political engagement, and relatively more successful with political knowledge. In each case, greater religiosity within a country serves to exacerbate the gaps between men and women. Political development and democratization helped to close the gap in knowledge, while economic development helped to close the gap in satisfaction. Some of the most important findings relate to the "dog that didn't bark." Variables associated specifically with the status of women were relatively unimportant in our results, especially as compared with the findings of research on incorporation of women into political elites.

Interpreting the larger significance of this study must take account of the limitations of the sample and its purported population. This study focuses on consolidated democracies in North America and Europe as well as Australia and New Zealand, and on the newer and developing democracies of the former Soviet Union and its satellites. We have every reason to expect that if the sample of countries were different, and could arguably represent a larger universe of electoral democracies from regions not tapped in this paper, and areas of the world whose economic and political development proceeded along lines
that are different from those represented here, we would find some different results.

Nevertheless, this study underscores three points. First, understanding the impact of gender on political orientations and behavior requires attending not just to micro-level phenomena, but to the macro-level as well, which implies the need for cross-national research – if we needed any more reason than already exists. As this study has shown, the significance of macro-level research is not just in exploring the direct impact on characteristics of women’s or men’s behavior or situation as, for example, when research suggests that PR increases the number of women in elected office. Macro-level variables can also be indicators of phenomena that moderate the relationship among micro-level variables, as when we find that the impact of gender on political knowledge is lower in more democratized countries. The distinction can be subtle, but it is theoretically important. Second, this study adds more evidence that it is wrong to theorize about the impact of gender on politics simply in terms of conventional wisdom and stereotype. Finally, it is clear that we cannot analyze the impact of gender on political orientations and behavior as a universal. It depends on what, exactly, is the question, and what, exactly, are the countries and conditions in which people live.
APPENDIX

Data Sources: The following data are not available in the original CSES data file.

GDP/Per Capita (PPPS): Freedom House Table of Social and Economic Indicators,


Scientists/engineers: The number of scientists and engineers in R&D per million people, 1987-97.
World Bank World Development Indicators, 2001, Table 5.11, “Science and technology,”


Female employment: Women as % of labor force. 1998, 2001 World Bank Development Indicators.


Gender Quota: Did either legislation or the rules of any major party require any type of quota or target for the number of female candidates or elected office holders? In most cases these are party requirements. Data gathered from many sources and supplied by Aili Tripp, University of Wisconsin – Madison, tripp@polisci.wisc.edu.

Gender role culture: The national mean on an additive scale designed from two agree-disagree questions in the World Values Survey. (1) “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than
women.” (2) “Do you think that a woman has to have a child to be fulfilled, or is that not necessary.” Correlation of the two items across all countries=.24. Range of the scale=0-6.

%Catholic: Central Intelligence Agency Factbook:

REFERENCES


Einhorn, Barbara. 1993. Cinderella Goes To Market : Citizenship, Gender And Women's Movements In East Central Europe.


Table 1: Impact of Gender on Political Knowledge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
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Notes: * = p < .05. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients, controlling for age, education, marital status, and labor force participation.
Table 2: Impact of Gender on Satisfaction with Electoral Democracy

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Notes: * = p < .05. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients, controlling for age, education, marital status, labor force participation, and perception of economy.
### Table 3: Impact of Gender on Political Engagement

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Notes: * = $p < .05$. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients, controlling for age, education, marital status, labor force participation, and perception of economy.